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ABSTRACT
The use of the marketable pollution permit (MPP) concept as an 
economic incentive for managing air and water pollution is examined. Forms of 
MPP systems include transferable discharge permits (TDPs), ambient permit 
systems (APS), emission permit systems (EPS) and the hybrid pollution-offset 
system (POS). The key insight is that a specialised market can be created for 
the trading of a new property right, the MPP, which entitles holders to 
discharge a specified quantity of pollution. Polluters who abate their 
pollution relatively cheaply would undertake more of the physical abatement 
effort and sell their surplus MPPs to polluters who face higher abatement 
costs. Aggregate pollution discharges would remain the same or be reduced by 
such trades.
In the United States of America there is active experimentation with 
MPP systems. The US Environment Protection Agency has pioneered the bubble, 
offsets and banking regulations under its innovative Emission Trading Policy 
for air pollution control. The State of Wisconsin has introduced a 
transferable discharge permit system for controlling BOD water pollution. 
Both these schemes bear a close resemblance to the hybid pollution offsets 
scheme proposed by Krupnick, Oates and Van De Verg (1983) and highlight the 
emerging convergence of economic theory and practical implementation of 
pollution controls.
The MPP is favoured as a regulatory reform for reducing the 
aggregate costs of pollution abatement. It is more cost-effective than 
existing standards-based systems on their own and is a more practical strategy 
than the introduction of pollution charges systems.
The potential application of the MPP concept in Australia is then 
examined. It is concluded that a MPP scheme along the lines of the hybrid 
pollution-offsets system is a worthwhile model on which to base the design and 
implementation of a MPP scheme in certain situations in Australia. Only in 
regions associated with major cities having a sufficient density of pollution 
sources could such a competitive, specialised market for MPPs become 
established and viable. This MPP scheme could be embedded in the existing 
standards-based regulatory system.
In other areas where such specialised markets would not be viable, 
it is nevertheless concluded that provisions akin to the bubble and offsets 
concepts developed by the USEPA could be introduced throughout Australia as a 
worthwhile adaption to existing pollution control laws. In fact progress in 
this direction in some jurisdictions has commenced.
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CHAPTER 1
INTRODUCTION
Although an unavoidable consequence of the production of goods 
valued by society, pollution causes a reduction in social welfare (in terms of 
public health and environmental amenity), and is a waste of resources and 
energy. This was increasingly realised by the community in the 1960s/1970s. 
As a consequence environment considerations entered political agendas and 
governments have responded with legislation and policies directed at achieving 
environmental goals. Much of this effort coincided with a buoyant period of 
economic conditions and so could be afforded. Despite the recent slowdown in 
economic activity in Australia and elsewhere, public opinion still insists 
that environmental controls should not be relaxed. At the same time there is 
greater scrutiny of the costs of environmental regulations in times of 
recession. As a result there have been attempts to reform environmental 
regulations to make them more efficient and cost-effective.
Environment protection laws de facto create scarcity in the 
availability of the assimilative capacity of the environment by limiting the 
previously unhindered access by polluters. Clean air, for example, is an 
environmental resource that was once treated as a free good but upon which 
environment laws now place a value. In other words the assimilative capacity 
of the environment has a price. It is only a small intuitive step from 
recognising the value of scarce environmental resources to suggesting that a 
specialised market can be established to allocate the now scarce environmental 
resources according to the price polluters are willing to pay to use such 
resources. The thesis of this paper is that such specialised markets can be 
more efficient in achieving environment quality objectives than the imposition 
of discharge standards by direct regulation and that such an approach is both 
conceptually and practically possible.
Meeting environmental quality objectives at lower cost is an 
attractive goal for industry and government which has the potential of being 
achieved with the formulation of economic incentives for cost-effectively 
managing air and water quality. In particular, the use of the recently
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developed marketable pollution permit (MPP) concept has great attraction as a 
cost-effective and administratively practical pollution abatement policy.
There has been a transition from early, reactive environmental 
policies that combatted past pollution problems of the 1970's (such as the 
imposition of direct discharge standards) to the more considered formulation 
and consolidation of environmental policies of the 1980's which are directed 
at meeting both economic development and environment protection objectives. 
There has been a re-assessment of existing pollution abatement regulations and 
innovation in policy design. On efficiency grounds, economists strongly 
support the use of economic incentives in policies to control pollution. 
However as noted by Oates (1983), there has been a quite remarkable shift in 
economists' support for the type of economic incentives that should be used - 
away from advocating pollution charges systems and toward endorsing the use of 
systems of marketable pollution permits which are becoming theoretically 
consistent, and politically and administratively acceptable.
The fundamental idea of MPPs is as follows (using air pollution as 
an example). The regulatory agency would set ambient air quality standard for 
a region and would use an air quality model to estimate the amount of area 
wide emissions that could be permitted without exceeding the standard. Then 
the regulatory agency would issue permits for emissions of this amount which 
then would be reallocated among emission sources according to a market 
process. Assuming that the market is sufficiently competitive, this procedure 
would lead to a final distribution of emissions that minimised the total costs 
of pollution abatement for the region. The reason for this efficient outcome 
is that each firm, in attempting to minimise its costs of production, would 
view the environment, through the MPP market, as a scarce resource not to be 
wasted. New sources of emissions can enter the airshed by purchasing MPPs 
from older, established sources in a specialised market. All sources can 
avoid the protracted regulatory proceedings that establish source-specific 
standards.
In the United States of America there is active experimentation with 
MPP systems. The concept of the MPP is gaining support administratively and 
in the economics literature for its cost-effectiveness over the more 
traditional standards-based approach to controlling air or water pollution. 
The bubble, offsets and emission reduction credits banking regulations 
pioneered by the US Environment Protection Agency (USEPA) under its innovative
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Emission Trading Policy can become components of a full marketable air- 
pollution permit system, but also on their own they can contribute to greater 
flexibility and cost-effectiveness of environmental regulations. In addition 
one State government has introduced a MPP scheme to control BOD water
pollution. Another pleasing aspect of the MPP idea is that conceptual
developments have mirrored practical implementation - i.e. a convergence of 
theory and practice.
This study first describes the Australian industry situation and 
then compares the traditional approaches to environment protection. Second, 
the theoretical basis of the marketable pollution permit concept is 
explained. Third, the practical application of the concept in USA is
described. Fourth, a number of key issues and an overview of the US
experience is discussed. Fifth, the potential applicability of the concept in 
Australia is considered.
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CHAPTER 2
AUSTRALIAN SITUATION
As community concern for the environment has grown over the last two 
decades governments in Australia have responded by enacting legislation to 
control pollution so as to protect public health and enhance environmental 
amenity. The pollution control measures that have been introduced have had 
economic and social benefits in the form of improvements in environmental 
quality and reduced damage to health, property and natural ecosystems. On the 
other hand the expenditures incurred in abating pollution have been 
considerable for both public and private sectors. The costs of pollution 
control regulations come under extra scrutiny during periods of slower 
economic activity and at such times the careful design and implementation of 
cost-effective regulations is particularly necessary.
It has been estimated that each year $500 million is expended on 
pollution control in the State of New South Wales by the public sector1. 
Included in this estimate are the pollution abatement expenditures by power 
generation agencies and the expenditure on wastewater treatment and waste 
disposal facilities (which generally in Australia are public sector 
functions). Preliminary estimates of annual private sector pollution 
abatement expenditure in NSW is of the order of $300 million.
The purpose of this chapter is to place the Australian industrial 
and pollution situation in a world context.
2.1 RECENT ESTIMATES OF'INDUSTRY POLLUTION ABATEMENT COSTS IN AUSTRALIA
The Australian Environment Council sponsored the Industry Pollution 
Abatement Costs Study which was undertaken by the Commonwealth Department of 
Home Affairs and Environment. The objective of the study was to establish a 
reliable data base on the costs to Australian industry of meeting pollution 
abatement requirements because statistics on environmental expenditures have 
not been collected systematically, particularly as few firms identify and 
assign capital and operating costs of measures for environment control.
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2.1. 1 Benchmark Estimates in Nine Industries 
The first report is a preliminary survey of nine manufacturing 
industries (AEG 1983a). It establishes a methodology for 'translating' 
pollution control cost data from studies undertaken in the United States to 
the Australian situation. Before presenting the benchmark estimates some 
comments on reliability are necessary because there were three sources of 
potential error. Firstly the US data was based upon engineering cost 
estimates which have a bias towards overestimation. Secondly, the translation 
methodology introduces several assumptions which affect the accuracy of the 
cost estimates. Thirdly the cost estimates obtained represent the attainment 
of pre-specifled levels of air and water pollution based on US standards. For 
each industry it was assumed a 'base level' of control similar to that 
existing in the US was being met; However, it was found that in most cases 
these US standards did not approximate to Australian standards which were 
usually established on a different basis. Nevertheless, the study has 
provided a set of 1 benchmark' air and water pollution abatement cost estimates 
for some Australian industries.
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Table 2.1: Estimated Benchmark Pollution Abatement Costs for Nine Australian
Industries
(1979 $A millions)
INDUSTRY AIR POLLUTION WATER POLLUTION
Cap.Cost Op.Cost Cap.Cost Op.Cost
Pulp and Paper 13.2 0.8 70.3 7.6
Primary Aluminium
- refining * 4.1
- smelting 36.4 5.7 3.0 1.2
Basic Petrochemicals** n. a. n.a. 2. 6-6.3 0.2-1.1
Soap and Detergent n.a. n. a. 3.8 0
Cement n. a. n. a. 14.4 1.2-2. 2
Iron and Steel ** 160.5 44.9 393.1 25.0
Red Meat Processing n. a. n. a. 384.5 57.2
Electroplating n. a. n.a. 58.6 4.9
Petroleum Refining n. a. n* cL • 55.3 5.7
Notes:
n.a. = not available
* = Red mud impoundment costs depend critically on local
topographical factors
** = These two industries are subject to more detailed reports
by the AEG study
Source:
Based on AEG (1983a, Table 3.1 and Section 3.3).
2.1.2 Iron and Steel industry
The second report (1983b) concerning the Australian integrated steel 
industry utilises pollution abatement cost data provided by the Broken Hill 
Proprietary Limited over the period 1960-1980 for its Port Kembla and 
Newcastle plants (which account for 80% of Australian steel making 
capacity). In summary the report finds:
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(i) The bulk of capital expenditure at the two plants over the period 
1960-1980 was concentrated on controlling air pollution (72%), with 
water pollution control accounting for 27% while noise control
(ii)
expenditure was minor at 1%.
Capital expenditure has been spread fairly evenly over the 20 year 
period with a peak in the early 1970's.
(iii) Capital expenditure on pollution control was 5.9% of total capital 
expenditure over the period (at Port Kembla the figure was 4.6% and 
at Newcastle the estimated figure was 9.4%).
(iv) The annual capital expenditure on pollution control per tonne of 
steel over the period 1969-1980 ranged from 0.16% to 1.18%.
(v) Operating costs account for 76% of total environmental expenditure in 
1979/80 with projected future increases in real terms. These costs
were heaviest in air pollution control and in the steel making
(vi)
process.
Against these operating costs were credits from materials recovered
as a result of the operation of pollution control equipment
equivalent to 7.2% of operating costs.
(vii) Overall macroeconomic impact has been small because the effect on raw 
steel prices of capital costs of pollution control measures has been
between 0.2% and 1.2% of the price of a tonne of raw steel.
(viii) The total annualised cost of pollution control (annualised capital 
cost plus net operating cost) in 1979/80 was $5.28 per tonne of raw 
steel production, i.e. 1.55% of the average domestic selling price of 
major steel products in Australia in 1980.
These results are significant because these substantial costs affect
all operations in the steel plant and under current regulations no trade-offs 
in pollution levels are allowed.
The report notes that there may be underestimation due to the 
difficulties of separating capital expenditures made for both economic and 
environmental reasons, e.g. water recirculation systems, and of classifying 
maintenance expenditures. Expenditures relating to occupational safety and 
health measure are not included.
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2.1.3 Petrochemical Industry
The other direct industry component of the AEG study was into the 
Australian petrochemical industry (AEG 1983c). The industry in this study 
component was defined in terms of its products, i.e. the production of organic 
compounds containing carbon from petroleum feedstocks and has a wider scope 
than covered in the first study component as it includes not only firms using 
primary processes but also the firms involved in the production of secondary 
or tertiary petrochemical products. This study component involved a 
questionnaire approach which was done in a manner to protect confidentiality.
Pollution abatement expenditures were collected for the period 1978- 
1981. Questionnaire respondents collectively accounted for two-thirds of 
Australian petrochemical production. The environmental capital expenditures, 
expressed as percentages of total capital expenditures ranged from 2.9% to 
8.4% over the study period. Operating costs for environmental purposes 
represented around 0.6% of total operating expenditures. Total environmental 
expenditures to total company expenditures fell in the range 0.8% to 1.1% in 
the four years covered. Operating expenditures were found to comprise the 
bulk of environmental expenditures. The report suggests that given the above 
results it would appear that the macro-economic impacts of pollution control 
have not been significant.
2.2 AUSTRALIAN INDUSTRY ~SITUATION IN WORLD TRADE CONTEXT
Australia is heavily dependent on natural resource commodity
exports - 75% of export earnings (valued at $14 144 million in 1979/80) are
derived from processed and unprocessed agricultural products (about 70% of
total Australian production) and mineral and energy commodities (about 50% of
2total Australian production) . Table 2.2 indicates the scale of such, industry 
in Australia.
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Table 2.2: Some Indicators of Australian Primary and Secondary Industry
Trade Activity*
Commodity** Domestic Prod'n Export Quantity Export Value
World
Export
Ranking
Wool 706000 tonnes 504000 tonnes $1700 mill 1st
Beef 1539000 709000 $1300 mill 1st
Live sheep n. a. 6000000 head n. a. 1st
Iron ore 92 mill tonnes 80 mill tonnes $1161 mill 1st
Rutile 474500 315000 $88 1st
Zircon
Refined
459000 " (a) 500000 $36 1st
lead 
(+ Lead
238000 154000 $138 1st
bullion n. a. 168000 n.a. ti« a • )
Alumina 7.2 mill tonnes 6.8 mill $1012 mill 1st
Black coal 83 mill tonnes 43 mill $1700 2nd
Wheat 15.3 " " (a) 14.9 " $2191 2nd
Tungston 3168 tonnes 2865 tonnes $53 2nd
Sugar 3 mill tonnes 2.4 mill tonnes $982 2nd
Sheepmeat 532000 tonnes 165000 tonnes n.a. 2nd
Ilmenite
Ref ined
1.2 mill tonnes 1 mill tonnes $25 2nd
copper 
(+ blister
147000 52000 $98
copper 
(+ copper
n. a. 21000 $39 n.a. )
concentrates
Refined
> n • 3. e 43000 $92 n.a. )
zinc 
(+ zinc
306000 tonnes 219100 $156 3rd
concentratesI n. a. 535000 $91 4th)
Nickel 73000 tonnes n.a. $327 -
Salt 5.3 " 4.5 " $43 -
Bauxite(b)
Dairy
27 mill tonnes 6.8 mill tonnes n. a. 3rd
products 301000 tonnes 96800 tonnes $284 mill -
Manganese
Tin
2 mill tonnes 1.3 mill tonnes n. a. 3rd
concentratesi 12571 tonnes 7423 tonnes $95 mill 6th
(+ tin metal 5423 tonnes 1437 tonnes $21 " 6th)
Notes:
* Either 1979 or 1980 data 
** This list is not exhaustive
(a) Stockpiling occurs
(b) Possible double counting in relation to alumina production 
Source:
Dept, of Trade & Resources (1982)
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In addition, Australia is also a leading exporter of barley. It is also noted 
that Australia produces 65% of its crude oil requirements (18.8 million tonnes 
per annum).
2.3 STRUCTURE OF INDUSTRY AND POLLUTION PROBLEMS3
In 1974 the Australian pulp and paper industry was composed of 
sixteen plants, mostly at coastal sites, utilising either chemical or 
mechanical means of pulping wood. More recently a new mill was opened at 
Albury in NSW. There are four plants in Tasmania, six in Victoria, three in 
N. S.W., two in S.A. and one each in W.A. and Queensland. The main types of 
air pollution are particulates and sulphur dioxide which arise from chemical 
pulping processes, power and steam boilers, and units used to recover spent 
chemicals. Odours may also be a problem. Water pollution poses a more 
important problem in the pulp and paper industry. Although a high degree of 
water recycling is practised, considerable quantities of liquid effluent are 
produced, including suspended solids, disolved solids, colour, disolved salts, 
thermal pollution a,nd heavy metal effluents.
The primary aluminium industry here is taken to mean two industrial 
processes - alumina refining and aluminium smelting (i.e. excludes bauxite 
mining). Production of aluminium begins with the processing of bauxite to 
alumina which basically involves digestion of bauxite by caustic soda using 
the Bayer process. The process results in an insoluble residue commonly known 
as red mud. There are some other waterborne wastes but the pollution control 
costs are not significant. Air emissions derive from fossil fuels used in the 
roasting of alumina and from steam raising. There are four alumina 
refineries, located at Pinjarra and Kwinana in W.A., and at Gladstone and Gove 
in Queensland. The second stage is aluminium smelting where alumina is 
smelted to produce primary aluminium. Economies of scale in aluminium 
smelting are relatively small because increase in capacity means adding more 
small furnaces in which the electrolytic refining occurs. Continuous 
generation of gaseous products results from the electrolytic refining and 
include volatile fluoride compounds, carbon monoxide and sulphur oxides. A 
fine dust is also produced. Both wet and dry scrubbing methods are used to 
reduce air pollution. If wet scrubbing is used this may in turn be a source 
of water pollution. In 1971 there were three aluminium smelters, since then 
three more have been constructed and two more have been proposed.
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The development of the petrochemical industry in Australia is linked 
to allied developments in the oil refining and chemical manufacturing 
industries which have close business, technical and locational 
relationships. Of the major oil refineries, four became associated with large 
scale petrochemical production and chemical manufacturing at Clyde and Botany 
in N.S.W. and at Altona and Geelong in Victoria. Petrochemical production 
itself only dates back to mid 1940's. The petrochemical industry is very 
capital intensive with a high degree of interdependency between different 
processes. The substantial economies of scale are a strong incentive to 
establish plants with a large production capacity. Nevertheless none of the 
plants in Australia are large on the world scale but may be optimum size 
relative to the market they supply. There are 14 firms in the industry and in 
each case at least 50% of ownership is foreign controlled. The world 
petrochemical industry is currently experiencing a period of slower growth and 
a number of plants are operating at less than full capacity. The overall 
scale of operations may be large, and the high capital cost of plant and the 
nature of most processes dictates that continuous operation is an economic and 
technical necessity.
Environmental problems fall into two main groups - continuous 
routine emissions and discharges, and fugitive emissions and discharges. The 
air emissions of greatest significance are odours, particulates and 
hydrocarbons (and chlorinated hydrocarbons) as well as nitrogen oxides, 
sulphur oxides and carbon monoxide. While the amount of airborne pollutants 
actually emitted from petrochemical plants may be of an order-of-magnitude of 
hundreds to thousands of tonnes per year, the amount of water pollutants 
actually discharged normally range between tens to hundreds of tonnes per 
year. This is partly due to the fact that expenditures on water pollution 
control have long exceeded air pollution abatement expenditures. Another 
reason for this is that the bulk of the compounds handled within the industry 
consists of hydrocarbons which are not easily soluble in water. Both organic 
and inorganic water pollutants are involved. The industry has also to deal 
with hazardous substances, solid wastes, noise and aesthetic pollution. The 
major pollution problems in the petrochemical industry relate to older 
plant. Although iterative improvements have been made to such plant there are 
often problems in respect to economic, spatial, operational or technical 
constraints. Little evidence was available to suggest that pollution control
requirements had directly influenced production methods or product choice. 
But it has been reported that pollution control requirements had contributed 
to the closure of four plants which were based on 1960 technology and which 
would have been uneconomic to upgrade to meet new environmental standards. 
With their connections to parent companies overseas, firms in Australia should 
enable them to have good access to technological innovations that reduce 
pollution generation.
The soap and detergent industry manufactures soap-based products and 
synthetic detergents. In Australia soap is only made by a process of the 
neutralisation of fatty acids using caustic soda. Synthetic detergents are 
mainly composed of surfactants (such as alkyl benzene sulphurates), inorganic 
builders and minor ingredients. Australian firms are not of a world scale in 
size. There are two integrated plants in Australia, plus several smaller but 
significant soap makers and detergent firms and a large number of small 
manufacturers. The market structure is similar with 4 or 5 firms accounting 
for 60% - 70% of total sales and the many small manufacturers accounting for 
about 10% of the market. Air pollution is a minor problem. The industry 
produces waste waters containing biodegradable and non-biodegradable 
pollutants which must be treated. The important biodegradable pollutants 
consist of organic raw materials, fats and oils and lost portions of finished 
product. Also pH levels may require treatment.
The cement industry blends crushed limestone, clay and gypsum which 
is then kiln-fired to produce cement clinker and then cooled and ground to a 
fine powder. The initial blending process can be done by using a wet or dry 
process. Although new plants tend to use the dry method which is more energy 
efficient, the majority of existing cement plants use the wet process. Plant 
sizes are comparable with the rest of the world. In 1975 there were 15 cement 
plants operating in Australia. These are usually either located in industrial 
estates alongside other types of polluting firms -or in the countryside with 
few land-use conflicts. The main waste from cement manufacture is dust. The 
major source of waterborne pollutants in the non—leaching process used in 
Australia is cooling water contaminated with cement dust. There may also be a 
thermal pollution and dust contaminated run-off problems but these are 
amenable to engineering solutions.
The manufacturing steps in the integrated steel industry comprise 
raw material preparation, ironmaking, steelmaking, casting and finishing all
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at the one site. There are now three integrated steel manufacturing complexes 
in Australia: Port Kembla N.S.W (5.1 million tonnes/year), Newcastle N.S.W. 
(2 million tonnes/year) and Whyalla S.A. (1.3 million tonnes). The now closed 
Kwinana W.A. plant only manufactured pig iron and lighter steel sections. 
There is also a steel rolling mill at Geelong, Victoria. All these plants 
have coastal locations. Each of the three plants concentrates on broad 
product groups - Port Kembla on flat products, Newcastle on bars and rods and 
Whyalla on structural shapes.
Considerable volumes of both gaseous emissions and liquid effluents 
are generated in the iron and steel industry. The major air pollutants are 
particulates, sulphur oxides together with nitrogen oxides and hydrocarbons. 
The major effluent problems are suspended solids and specific organic and 
inorganic pollutants. In addition substantial amounts of solid wastes are 
generated. Noise can also be a problem.
The Broken Hill Proprietary Company Limited (BHP) became the sole 
Australian integrated steel manufacturer in 1935. BHP also owns companies 
such as Comsteel, Australian Wire Industries, John Lysaght Australia and 
Tubemakers. However the Smorgon company recently began to develop a steel 
manufacturing plant in a non-integrated mill near Melbourne which is expected 
to commence production by 1984. BHP was the 14th largest steel company in the 
Western World in 1979 when Australia ranked 18th among countries producing raw 
steel. BHP dominated the Australian market over the period 1960-1980, 
although during this period imports ranged between 9% and 24.8% of apparent 
domestic steel production. About 40% of BHP's domestic steel sales volume 
goes to affiliated companies.
Between 1975-1982 BHP's annual volume of steel sales increased 
steadily with a total rise of 117%, however profitability has fluctuated 
widely with a loss in 1982 and a loss expected again in 1983. It is expected 
in Australia (and overseas) that as the steel industry faces continuing 
pressures for structural adjustment and modernisation, 'change-in process' 
methods such as continuous casting will account for an increasing proportion 
of pollution control expenditure instead of the traditional 'end-of-pipe* 
pollution control technologies. Any program of modernisation of plant 
facilities (involving substantial investment) gives scope for major reductions 
in pollution at relatively low cost.
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2.4 A PERSPECTIVE
Australia is not heavily industrialised in comparison with Western 
Europe or North America. The density of polluting industry is such that only 
in a few locations would economic activities generate pollution that had an 
environment impact as severe as in some overseas industrial areas. There has 
been continuity in the form of pollution control regulations used in Australia 
during the last ten to twenty years. These regulations have followed the 
traditional approach of imposing direct abatement standards on pollution 
sources.
The overall conclusion emerging from the three Australian 
Environment Council reports on industry pollution abatement costs is that such 
costs are generally not a large component of total capital or operating costs, 
although for some firms or some processes high expenditures were incurred in 
some years. Not many firms maintain separate records detailing their 
expenditures to meet environmental requirements. The two direct industry 
study reports note that the development of an environment accounting system 
which records the costs of pollution control would have value not just as an 
inventory of incurred costs but also in establishing a reliable and common 
basis for industry and government to use in the formulation of efficient and 
cost-effective strategies for future pollution control policies and 
regulations. The current lack of this pollution abatement costs information 
suggests that industry generally has not been over-concerned about the levels 
of expenditure.
Notes:
1. State Pollution Control Commission, (1983) Pollution Control in New South
Wales: a Progress Report (Supplement to 1982-83 Annual Report of the
State Pollution Control Commission). Sydney: SPCC.
2. Department of Trade and Resources, (1982) Australian Resources in a World 
Context: Facts and Figures. Canberra: APGS.
3. Based on AEC (1983a, 1983b and 1983c).
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CHAPTER 3
TRADITIONAL APPROACHES TO ACHIEVING ENVIRONMENT QUALITY
To guide the application of pollution abatement policies, the 
polluter-pays principle was developed. This provided a pragmatic approach, 
based on efficiency criteria, for allocating the costs of pollution control. 
Traditionally major reliance has been placed on the use of standards-based 
approaches for the control of pollution. At the same time, economists have 
advocated the use of. pollution charges as an economic incentive to control 
pollution but this has had little practical application.
3.1 POLLUTER-PAYS PRINCIPLE
In the early 1970's the formulation of the Polluter-Pays Principle 
(PPP) was helped by Australian trade and environment officials. Commonwealth 
and State Governments in Australia generally adhere to the PPP.
The Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development has 
closely examined the economic effects of environmental policies. The OECD 
Council in May 1972 issued a Recommendation on Guiding Principles Concerning 
International Economic Aspects of Environmental Policies. The corner-stone of 
these policies was the implementation of the PPP by Member countries. 
Paragraph 4 reads:
The principle to be used for allocating costs of pollution prevention and 
control measures to encourage rational use of scarce environmental 
resources and to avoid distortions in international trade and investment 
is the so-called "Polluter-Pays Principle". The Principle means that the 
polluter should bear the expenses of carrying out the above mentioned 
measures decided by public authorities to ensure that the environment is 
in an acceptable state. In other words, the cost of these measures should 
be reflected in the cost of goods and services which cause pollution in 
production and/or consumption. Such measures should not be accompanied by 
subsidies that would create significant distortions in international trade 
and investment.
In November 1974 OECD Council reaffirmed that the PPP constitutes for 
Member countries a fundamental principle for allocating costs of pollution 
prevention and control measures introduced by the public authorities in Member 
countries, and issued a Recommendation on the Implementation of the Polluter- 
Pays Principle limiting exceptions to the Principle and establishing a 
notification procedure to report any schemes of financial assistance to 
polluters specifically for pollution control.
OECD (1975) described the PPP in the following terms:
The Polluter-Pays Principle is not a Principle of compensation. Nor does 
it mean that the polluter should merely pay the cost of measures to 
prevent pollution. The Polluter-Pays Principle means that the polluter 
should be charged with the cost of whatever pollution prevention and 
control measures are determined by the public authorities, whether 
preventative measures, restoration, or a combination of both. If a 
country decides that above and beyond the costs of controlling pollution, 
the polluters should compensate the polluted for the damage which would 
result from residual pollution (when the measures taken by the public 
authorities do not imply a total ban on pollution), this measure is not 
contrary to the Polluter-Pays Principle, but the Principle does not make 
this additional measure obligatory: in other words the Principle is not 
itself a principle intended to internalise fully the costs of pollution.
Temporary exceptions from the Principle allowed are assistance during 
transitional arrangements, support for technological innovation for 
controlling pollution and when environmental protection measures would 
jeopardise the social and economic policy objectives of a country or region. 
The notion of an 'acceptable state' decided by the public authorities implies 
that through a process of collective choice and in view of the limited 
information available, the advantage of a further reduction in the residual 
social damage involved is considered as being smaller than the social cost of 
further control. The Principle is an efficiency criterion for allocating 
costs and does not involve bringing pollution down to an optimum level. The 
instruments for applying the Polluter-Pays Principle range from process and
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product standards, individual regulations and prohibitions to the use of 
economic incentives whether applied individually or in combination.
In order to monitor Member country implementation of the Principle, 
the OECD instituted a notification procedure to report on financial assistance 
systems used for environmental purposes. The first two phases of this work 
were completed in 1977 and 1980. The notification procedures have generated 
data for the period 1973 to 1978, and it has been concluded that financial 
assistance peaked in most countries around 1975 and 1976; however since then, 
no general trend is discernible. However the conditions laid down in the PPP 
concerning the transitional period were not being strictly followed, and that 
one OECD country continued to pay assistance to new plants. Possible trade 
and economic impacts of financial assistance systems have become less 
important over time. The examination was carried out at the aggregate level 
and no conclusions could be drawn at the sectoral or industry level.
3.2 COMPARISON OF'POLLUTION STANDARDS APPROACH AND
pollution ~charges'Approach
This study concentrates on the usefulness of a new policy - the 
marketable pollution permit (MPP) - to control pollution. It is not intended 
here to address the important step of setting the allowable pollution levels 
as this is will documented in the pollution economics literature (see, for 
example, the survey by Fisher & Peterson (1976)). It is noted that such a 
step is required irrespective of whether the pollution control policy adopted 
involves imposition of direct controls or uses economic incentives. The 
economic analysis of environmental problems is to a large extent an 
application of the general princip-les of public goods and externalities. 
Baumol & Oates (1975) discuss in detail the various types of externality 
situations that degrade the environment. Dorfman & Dorfman (pp. 4-6, 1977) 
provide a simple introduction to the optimal management of a public good 
(using smoke abatement as the example, without considering equity aspects). 
In pollution economics theory, the optimal allowable pollution level is set 
where the marginal cost of pollution abatement equals the marginal pollution 
damage cost (ie. the marginal benefit of avoided pollution damage).
However the first-best solution of setting the pollution standard at 
where the marginal cost of pollution reduction equals the marginal damage cost 
does not fully account for the cost of external damage created by any
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remaining pollution. Buchanan & Tullock (1975) consider that it is necessary 
to restrict the production level of a competitive industry as well as its 
pollution to duplicate the results of a pollution tax. But this restriction 
of production could cause above normal profits in the industry and the 
possibility of an inefficient allocation of production among producers. 
Harford & Ogura (1983) examine a second-best approach of using the pollution 
to output ratio as the regulatory policy rather than an absolute standard (in 
the absence of an optimum pollution tax or any output controls on a pollution 
generating, perfectly competitive industry, and under the assumption that it 
is technically possible to vary the ratio of pollution to output) because they 
consider this approach more closely resembles the way actual pollution 
standards are set. They conclude from a general equilibrium analysis that 
this second-best approach to pollution standard setting is more complicated 
and requires more information.
Harford & Ogura (1983) also note that the benefits of existing 
pollution standards may be underestimated if one ignores the benefits gained 
by a reduction in the ouput of our industry whose output price is below 
marginal social cost. In such circumstances, raising the price of output 
through higher unit costs caused by more stringent pollution standards 
provides additional social benefits.
The setting of allowable pollution levels at where marginal 
pollution abatement cost is equal to marginal pollution damage costs is in 
fact very difficult due to information deficiencies such as dose-response 
relationships. Baumol & Oates (1975, 1979) discuss setting pollution
standards in theory and practice. Davis III & Davis (1975) also discuss the 
practical nuts and bolts of setting pollution standards and illustrate the 
political and administrative complexities that have to be confronted by 
reference to the USA experience in the early 1970s. In practice the standard 
set is essentially arbitrary having been based on imperfect knowledge and 
community attitudes. By the end of the 1970s, many pollution standards had 
been set (although they may be revised in the light of new knowledge or 
changed social goals). The role of this study is to examine a new policy 
option that achieves these set pollution standards more efficiently and 
effectively, through the introduction of a MPP system as an adaption to 
existing direct regulation approches used in Australia. It is necessary first 
to compare the two main existing approaches for achieving these set standards
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before describing MPPs and examining their usefullness in achieving 
environmental goals as is done in the next four chapters of this study.
There has been an almost universal adoption of the strategy of 
directly imposing standards on the strength and quantity of pollution allowed 
by each source. This approach involves the regulatory agency determining a 
pollution level that has to be met by each polluter. Compliance with 
standards is checked by monitoring. In many cases the type of equipment 
required or the abatement process to be adopted is specified. Except in the 
case of hazardous substances, standards are not aimed at reducing pollution to 
zero as this may be extremely cstly in comparison with the damage avoided.
It has long been realised that excessive pollution results from 
inadequate signals of conventional markets about the value society places on 
the use of environmental resources such as clean air or water. The problem 
arises from the allocation and use of a property right that has been poorly 
defined in legal terms. These negative, social costs have been termed by 
economists as externalities. To correct such situations, economists have 
advocated the use of economic incentives as a more efficient way of achieving 
environmental quality goals rather than the use of a direct regulation 
approach through the imposition of standards (for example, see Baumol and 
Oates, 1975, Chapter 4). Economists advocate (on efficiency grounds) the use 
of pollution charges (also known as a 'Pigovion Tax') as an economic incentive 
on firms to internalise the external social costs associated with their 
pollution so that market prices paid for a firm's products reflect the full 
costs of production, including the social costs of pollution that the firm may 
be causing . As an economic incentive, the main advantages accorded to the 
pollution charges approach over the traditional direct regulation standards- 
based approach are as follows:
(i) Charges provide an economic incentive to polluters to reduce their 
pollution to a level where the unit rate of charge equals the 
marginal cost of treatment (the theoretical optimum is where marginal 
abatement cost equals marginal pollution damage cost).
(ii) Charges can be a continuing incentive to polluters to abate pollution 
to a level below that required by regulatory agencies (except for 
zero discharge standards).
(iii) The use of a charges scheme is the least cost method for the
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community as a whole of reaching environmental quality targets as 
easy-to-abate pollution sources are controled to a greater degree 
than difficult-to-abate pollution sources.
(iv) A charges approach can stimulate ’compliance' technological
innovation to meet environmental quality targets at less cost (and 
perhaps indirectly lead to 'spin-off' product innovations).
The saving in abatement costs relative to a standards approach consists of 
both 'static' savings from a more cost-effective allocation of abatement 
efforts and 'dynamic' savings realised from technological innovation. The
extent of the savings depends on the actual design of the environmental 
policies. A number of modelling studies attest to the cost-effectiveness of 
the pollution charges approach - for example see the summary in Baumol & Oates 
(1979) and in Tietenberg (1980).
Unfortunately there exist some practical difficulties for the
regulatory agency involved in implementing a charges-based pollution control 
system, including:
(i) The pollution charge rate is difficult to set because of the need to 
quantify the pollution damage costs caused by each polluter in 
monetary terms.
(ii) There is difficulty in adjusting the charge rate to meet changing 
circumstances.
(iii) Given prevailing resource constraints, a regulatory agency would be 
hard pressed to administer a pollution charges system (i.e. 
substantial information and administrative costs would be involved). 
These problems only partly explain why pollution charges schemes have
so far have had little use in practice. However there can be more fundamental 
behavioural reasons for why this is so. The public-choice theory of policy 
advanced by Buchanan & Tullock (1975) attempts to explain this prevalance of 
direct regulation. Their key point is that the interests of those who are 
subjected to pollution control quotas need to be taken into account as well as 
the interests of those affected by pollution externalities, that is the 
behavioural adjustments to policy instruments must be considered. Using a 
model of an industry where the pollution level is directly related to output 
level and the pollution damage function is linear with respect to industry 
output, they show that direct regulation of the negative externality will be
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preferred in spite of the recognised efficiency of imposing pollution 
charges. Despite the motivation which each firm has to violate assigned 
pollution quotas under regulation, it remains in the interest of firms to seek 
a regulatory policy that will enforce the quotas for two reasons. Firstly the 
imposition of fixed pollution quotas to existing firms in the industry will 
restrict the ability of new firms to enter that industry. Secondly, direct 
regulation creates a cartel-like situation with the possibility that existing 
firms can secure above-normal profits due to reduced aggregate industry output 
caused by the direct regulation. Both direct regulation and pollution charges 
are allocatively equivalent in terms of achieving the required improvement in 
ambient environmental quality. However each policy has different 
distributional effects because a pollution charge would generate revenue for 
government and those who anticipate some benefit from the utilisation of such 
revenues would support the pollution charges policy while those who don’t 
receive a benefit would oppose such a measure. It is then up to the political 
process to decide which policy measure is chosen in the light of the 
preferences of a large number of people who would expect to receive some 
benefit (albeit small) from the use of the charge revenue as against the 
preferences of a small, concentrated, identifiable and interested pressure 
group from the industry to be regulated. In addition, the pollution charge 
amounts to a legislated change in de facto property rights and will be seen as 
confiscatory by the affected industry. These two factors in the political 
process mean that the temptation to adopt a direct regulatory approach may be 
very strong indeed. The authors conclude that a pollution charges approach 
may find better favor if institutional arrangements are sought or invented 
which make pollution charges more acceptable to those who are primarily 
affected (for example having government assistance for pollution control 
research or subsidies to those in the industry who suffer capital loss as part 
of the pollution charges policy). As will be seen in the following chapters 
of this paper, the problems noted by Buchanan & Tullock concerning (i) 
treatment of de facto property rights (to pollute), (ii) a pollution charges 
policy acceptable to polluters, pollutees and governments, and (iii) coping 
with entry of new firms to an industry, can be resolved throught the careful 
design of marketable pollution permit systems.
Although subsidies are a form of economic incentive to firms to 
reduce pollution, they are inferior to Pigovian taxes on effectiveness, cost-
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effectiveness and equity grounds. Subsidies conflict with the spirit of the 
Polluter-Pays Principle. Both Dorfman & Dorfman (p. 24, 1977) and US Senate 
Committee on Environment and Public Works (1977) note the inadequacies of 
subsidies.
3.3 APPLICATION OF STANDARDS~ AND CHARGES
In their survey of the economics of regulation in Australia, Pincus
& Withers (1983, p.43) note that in relation to environmental regulation,
Australian economists have largely repeated the overseas arguements about the
2charges versus standards debate. For example, Chisholm (1979) and others 
argue the case for charges, and Gorrie and Grenning (1979)2 argue for a mixed 
strategy. On the other hand, Ulph (1979)2 has shown, however, that standards 
are preferable to charges where:
(i) there is uncertainty about the effects of the charge on pollution 
levels, and
(ii) the damage costs of pollution rise sharply past a certain level and 
are not immediately reversible.
They comment that a polluting firm will prefer a mandatory pollution quota to 
an allocatively equivalent tax as long as the quota is not charged for which 
may mean that the use of direct regulation is more politically acceptable. 
They suggest that this aspect, rather than the abstruse efficiency arguments 
of economists, may explain the 'iron law of actual environmental policy: do 
not use fiscal instruments' (based on the Australian experience in the 
1970's).
The Pincus & Withers survey did not look at the alternative of 
marketable pollution permits as an economic incentive for controlling 
pollution. From my own discussions with various environmental agencies in 
Australia, this view is a little exaggerated as these agencies are beginning 
to recognise that environmental decisions are ultimately economic decisions of 
choosing between alternatives. Pollution control agencies have started 
looking at a greater role for economic incentives in their regulations. This 
is evidenced by the fact that the NSW State Pollution Control Commission and 
the Commonwealth Department of Home Affairs and Environment now have 
environment economics units and the Victorian and Western Australian 
environmental agencies carry out cost-benefit analysis studies. During 1978 
agencies affiliated with the Australian Environment Council and the Council of 
Nature Conservation Ministers sponsored the inaugural National Environmental
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oEconomics Conference and a second event two years later . A third conference 
is planned for later in 1984.
France and the Netherlands have schemes for pollution charges 
operating in relation to noise or water pollution. West Germany also has
enacted several environmental charge schemes but these have only been applied
in an extremely limited context. However there is one genuine pollution
charge in West Germany for the control of water pollution. Their National 
Parliament enacted the effluent charge law in 1976. The law is implemented by 
the State governments which will be able to use the revenues to cover
administrative and research costs, and the construction of pollution control 
facilities. The first charge was imposed in 1981. The scheme is directed at 
controlling discharges of suspended solids, chemical oxygen demand, mercury, 
cadmium and toxicity to fish. The charge is based on 'pollution units' and 
increases during the transition period from 12DM/unit in 1981 to 40DM/unit in 
1986. Although the actual charge is lower than the abatement costs in some 
instances, Ewringmann (1984) reports that it has been high enough to provide 
an economic incentive to reduce discharges even prior to the first imposition 
of the charge and to cause acceleration of plans to install pollution
abatement measures. A report by the Organisation for Economic Co-operation 
and Development (OECD 1980) finds that the charges schemes that have been
introduced tended to be revenue raising taxes rather than charges on
pollution. There have been no pollution charge schemes introduced to control 
air pollution. Given this experience, it is interesting to note that the New 
South Wales State Pollution Control Commission is now examining the scope for 
and feasibility of using pollution charges.
Notes:
1. Pigou (1952, 4th ed.) developed the concept of externalities. The
impositions of a Pigorian tax internalises these social costs on the
polluting firms.
2. Department of Science and Environment, (1979), Environmental Economics. 
Proceedings of the inaugural National Environment Economics Conference, 
ANU Canberra, May 1978. Canberra: AGPS
3. Department of Home Affairs and Environment and Environment Protection 
Authority of Victoria, (1981), Costs and Benefits of Environment 
Protection. Proceedings of the National Conference on the Costs and 
Benefits of Environment Protection, Melbourne, October 1980. Canberra: 
AGPS.
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CHAPTER 4
MARKETABLE POLLUTION PERMITS
Marketable pollution permits (MPPs), sometimes called tradeable or 
transferable discharge permits can be used to achieve any set level of air or 
water pollution abatement. They are not intended to solve the problem of how 
much waste should be assimilated by the environment. The idea is to provide a 
market mechanism that encourages dischargers who can abate pollution 
relatively cheaply to do most of the physical cleanup. The advantage of MPP 
systems is that they allocate the arbitrarily set allowable pollution levels 
more efficiently among polluters. A marketable pollution permit, while an 
economic incentive, is not a pollution charge.
The creation of the right to pollute implies a subtle institutional 
charge. Dragun (1982) notes that this involves the government of the day as 
the ultimate policy power of a nation actively or passively giving legal 
standing to a new property right (or to an existing property right that was 
previously unrecognised) to use the assimilative capacity of the environment 
but including a duty not to over use such capacity. Governments can decide to 
either give such property rights to individuals or alternatively governments 
can sell such rights. There are a number of benefits from such a direct 
property rights approach in resolving pollution externality problems noted by 
Dragun. Firstly, such a proposal should be socially acceptable since it 
operates within established social norms of economic behaviour. Secondly, the 
basis of income uncertainty is reduced because there will not be the need for 
continued direct market involvement of government or the high commitment of 
transaction costs as with a pollution charges strategy. Finally, by carefully 
specifying the ground rules for the use of the pollution right, the government 
not only maintains control over resource use and possible activities in the 
economy, but also is in a position to influence economic structure and 
performance over time.
Besides the problem of measuring and valuing damages caused by 
pollution inherent in the charges approach described in the previous Chapter, 
it is noted that the pollution charges approach to policy-making does not 
accord well with typical governmental administrative procedures. In practice
environmental decision-making usually entails two distinct steps - first the 
setting of acceptable standards of environmental quality, and second the 
design of policies to achieve these standards. From the perspective of the 
practical concerns of policymakers, some quite important distinctions emerge 
between these two economic incentive systems. Marketable pollution permits 
have five significant advantages relative to the more traditional pollution 
charge approach (Baumol & Oates 1979, Oates 1983):
(i) The use of marketable pollution permits reduces uncertainty and 
adjustment costs in attaining mandated levels of environmental 
quality. In contrast to the Pigovian approach of setting a charge, 
under a marketable pollution permit scheme the environment agency 
directly sets the aggregate quantity of emissions at the allowable 
standard.
(ii) Complications for the setting of the level of the pollution charge 
that result over time from economic growth (e.g. caused by population 
increase and industrial expansion) and inflation are avoided because 
the rise in demand for permits translates directly into a higher 
price.
(iii) Relative to the introduction of a system of pollution charges (which 
may involve enormous increases in costs faced by polluters due to 
this new source of costs), a system of marketable pollution permits 
can be implemented with an initial distribution of lump sum 
entitlements to existing polluters based on historical behaviour 
(i.e. a 'grandfather allocation' with good political acceptability), 
although if an initial auction was used there would be a new source 
of costs.
(iv) Coping with spatial variations (i.e. the pollution discharge location 
itself and the assimilative capacity and conditions of the 
environment at that location) in environmental quality would be 
administratively cumbersome for a pollution charges system (because a 
separate charge level would have to be determined for each source 
depending on its location) but under a system of marketable pollution 
permits these spatial variations can be incorporated in a way that is 
less objectionable by allowing trading in marketable pollution 
permits subject only to the constraint of no violations of the
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(v)
predetermined environmental quality standard at any receptor point. 
Marketable pollution permit systems appear to be more feasible on the 
grounds of familiarity as it is a less radical step to add the 
ability of trading in permits to the existing regulatory standards- 
based system, rather than replacing this existing system with a 
completely new system of pollution charges.
Of course, monitoring and enforcement activities by the environmental agencies 
are still required.
In the late 1970's the United States Environment Protection Authority 
(USEPA) was trying to meet practical problems associated with implementing the 
inflexible, command and control regulations of the US Clean Air Act (a 
traditional standards based approach) at a time of depressed economic activity 
and a change in government. The USEPA's regulatory innovations, known as the 
bubble, offsets and banking policies were part of its recently formulated 
Emission Trading Policy (originally known as Controlled Trading) which were 
aimed at achieving the $et air quality standards at lower cost to industry. 
Meanwhile one US State Government - Wisconsin - began to formulate a 
transferable discharge permit scheme for controlling discharges to its heavily 
polluted waterways. Thus it is only since 1976 for air pollution offsets and 
since 1979 for 'bubble' and banking provisions (with final regulations 
promulgated in 1979 and 1982) that a partial basis of a market for air 
pollution permits emerged, and only since 1982 that a scheme of transferable 
discharge permits entered operation. Now the government of the State of 
Maryland is examining the most conceptually advanced design of a market in air 
pollution permits in their State Implementation Plan within the broad 
guidelines set by the"USEPA. Very recent economics literature has described 
the conceptual and practical basis for systems of marketable pollution permits 
and change in the attitudes of economists to that of supporting the concept of 
marketable pollution permits has been quite remarkable.
4.l SOME EXAMPLES OF'SPECIALISED MARKETS
The key to a successful MPP system is the careful design of the 
specialised market in which MPPs are allowed to be traded. To gain some 
insights into how to design a MPPs market, several authors have examined how 
other specialised markets have operated.
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In a study funded by the USEPA, deLucia (1974) examined the possible 
use of 'marketable effluent permits' as a water pollution control tool. The 
author notes that in the light of industrial organisation literature, the 
primary problems of market conduct and structure have to do with the size and 
distribution of pollution sources and the conduct of the large pollution 
sources. A market that is too small or is heavily concentrated and under the 
direct influence of a small number of participants would not be expected to be 
competative or efficient. One quoted study suggests that in a simple 
situation the price with ten sellers in the market does not differ too much 
from the price with a thousand sellers. Another study quoted suggests that a 
'critical level' of concentration occurs roughly when seventy percent or more 
of the market is controlled by the eight largest firms. The author concludes 
that there is some assurance that a market for marketable effluent permits is 
likely to function effectively if there are more than ten polluters involved 
in a market. He then examines three markets which are analogous in one way or 
another to a market for MPPs - the US Treasury Bill market, the taxi medallion 
market and the market for offshore oil drilling leases and notes the following 
points :
(i) The US Treasury Bills market suggests that competitive bidding in 
auctions for pollution entitlements is more likely to provide better 
information about the marginal costs of waste treatment (i.e. 
polluters' true demand schedule); and is more likely to lead to the 
efficient allocation of pollution entitlements.
(ii) Noting that there is a fixed quantity of taxi medallions, experience 
in the markets for medallions suggests that a relatively small market 
can operate reasonably well in terms of providing a ready opportunity 
to buyers and sellers (at the going price); however the taxi fleet 
owners through their refusal to sell medallions to independents are 
acting as monopolists; and experience has shown that it is very 
difficult politically to alter the number of rights once they are 
issued.
(iii) In bidding for off shore oil drilling leases, the behaviour of market 
participants has been consistent with rational, independent bidding 
behaviour (with a lognormal distribution of bids).
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Related to the MPP concept is the concept of transferable development 
rights as a new land use policy tool that overcomes the 'windfall/wipeout ' 
dilemma and the perverse economic incentives which is the major weakness of 
traditional land use zoning policy. If implemented, such rights would be 
traded in specialised markets. Such rights could be transferred through 
private markets or thorugh a government run 'bank'. Barrows & Prenguber 
(197 5) examine the issues in establishing and administering such a program. 
Under such a program, the local zoning body would identify development and 
preservation zones. Restricted land-owners would be assigned development 
rights units, and development zone land-owners would be prohibited from 
developing beyond some specified density unless they purchase development 
rights from restricted land-owners in the preservation zone. Thus 
preservation zone land-owners would be compensated for their 'wipe-out' losses 
by the sale of development rights to development zone land-owners wishing to 
develop. The authors note that administrative decisions and the
legal/technical definition of a transferable development right are critical, 
and can greatly affect the impact of such a program. Also they note that full 
compensation to restricted land-owners would require widely fluctuating prices 
for these rights. In addition the timing of demand for these rights may not 
coincide with rights holders willingness to sell. Even with no timing 
problems, a market for transferable development rights would not function as a 
perfectly competitive market because the necessity of relatively small 
preservation districts means few right owners and likely few developers so 
that bargaining strategies become quite important and the market may be 
characterised by a high degree of speculation. Field & Conrad (197 5) also 
caution that apparently minor variations in the institutions and transfer 
rules governing these transferable development rights schemes can result in 
significant differences in their efficiency, within a land-use planning 
program as well as the distribution of costs and benefits within a 
community. Wolfram (1981) notes that several governments, at both state and 
local levels in the USA, have undertaken steps to protect their farmlands and 
open space in the last few years with mixed success. He noted that in 1980 
King County in Washington State was the first local government to introduce a 
type of scheme of transferable development rights. He concludes that schemes 
for transferable development rights, such as practiced in King County, 
provides a way of using a free market to price the positive public good
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externality provided by farmers and other owners of open-space land, and that 
it is potentially superior to zoning in assuring both equity and efficiency in 
this aspect of land use. This discussion of specialised markets for 
transferable development rights highlights on one hand the need for 
competition in the market, the careful design of the rights required and the 
care needed in the allocation of rights, and on the other hand the benefits 
that may be gained from a more market oriented approach to achieving 
environmental quality.
An arrangement similar to the transferable development rights 
concept was used in North Sydney NSW to enable the preservation of 'Don Bank', 
an historic building. The owners sold this place to the National Trust of 
Australia and, with the agreement of the local council, sold the 'unused' 
development rights for a set number of floors of a high rise building to a 
commercial property development company which transfers this entitlement to 
another site nearby where a new building can be constructed to a height in 
excess of the council's set limits.
Other specialised markets have provided some insights into the 
design of MPP systems. Of some current interest in Australia is recent 
research into the use of transferable water rights in situations where scarce 
water resources have to be allocated between competing users and supply 
augmentation is not a viable option (see, for example, the papers given to the 
Seminar on Transferable Water Rights held in Melbourne on 11 December 1984 by 
the Australian Water Resources Council and the Australian Agricultural 
Economics Society). However practical experience in MPP markets is now being 
gained in USA and so discussion of MPP systems is best based on actual market 
outcomes observed. These insights emerge from discussion in the following 
chapters.
4.2 THEORETICAL PERSPECTIVES OF THE MARKETABLE POLLUTION PERMIT CONCEPT
The key insight of the marketable pollution permit concept is based 
on the realisation that the behavioural reason for pollution problems is the 
existence of an ill-defined set of property rights with a consequent non­
op timal use of the environment. The right to discharge pollutants had 
historically, in the absence of government intervention, been allocated at a 
zero price for all users (Tietenberg 1980). From this perspective it follows 
that a particular policy approach to controlling pollution would be the
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establishment of a correctly defined right to discharge pollutants which can 
be bought and sold in markets at a price determined by the supply and demand 
for the assimilative capacity of the environment.
4.2.1 Key Marketable Pollution Permit insight
The concept of markets in pollution rights as a means of efficiently 
achieving environmental quality goals was pioneered in an essay by Dales 
(1968). He suggested that legal definitions of property rights lie at the 
heart of social decisionmaking and problem solving. To ensure rational use of 
environmental resources such as air and water (or even the use of land for 
waste disposal) Dales proposed that new forms of property rights be devised, 
not to air and water, but to the use of air and water. He then goes on to 
show that as economic activity is based on property rights, then economic 
solutions to pollution problems also involve property rights solutions. 
Dales' key insight was to suggest creating a specialised market for the buying 
and selling of pollution rights or entitlements*.
The government would first set the total allowable amount of 
pollution within a region. It would then issue a set number of new 'property* 
rights that are legal entitlements to dispose a certain quantity of wastes 
that corresponds to the aggregate level of pollution allowed. These 
entitlements are then allowed to be traded in a specially created market. The 
amount of entitlements issued would be reviewed periodically by the regulatory 
agency. The market then provides an economic incentive to managers of both 
private and public sector polluting activities to achieve the required 
reduction in pollution at the lowest possible cost to the society.
Dales considered that it would be impracticable to use his proposal 
to control diffuse sources and non-stationary sources of pollution. For that 
matter it would also be inadequate as a measure for controlling the disposal 
of hazardous substances.
4.2.2 Early Concepts
The next major step in the conceptual development of marketable 
pollution rights was the technical paper by Montgomery (1972) which discusses 
two systems of marketable pollution permits: (i)
(i) a system of 'pollution licences' (i.e. an ambient pollution permit
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system) that defines allowable emissions in terms of pollutant 
concentrations at a set of receptor points, and
(ii) a system of 1 emission licences' (i.e. an emission pollution permit 
system) that confers directly the right to emit pollutants up to a 
specified rate.
He shows that the 'pollution licence’ system satisfies the important 
condition that a market equilibrium coincides with the least-cost solution for 
attaining any predetermined level of environment quality and, significantly, 
does so for any initial allocation of 'pollution licences'. Since a polluter 
in general will affect air or water quality at a number of points, he will be 
required to hold a portfolio of licences covering all relevant receptor 
points. Thus the transaction costs for polluting firms under this system 
could be quite substantial. Montgomery's alternative system of 'emission 
licences' promises considerable savings in transactions costs. However the 
paper also shows that an extremely restrictive condition is required for an 
initial allocation of 'emission licences' to ensure that the market 
equilibrium is the least-cost solution. This shortcoming has serious 
implications because, first, the regulatory agency may not be able to find an 
initial allocation of 'emission licences' that ensures an efficient outcome, 
and second, even if this were possible, flexibility in choosing t his initial 
allocation can be constrained (so reducing political feasibility). Montgomery 
concludes that a market in 'pollution licences' would be more widely accepted 
than a market in 'emission licences', especially as such a scheme would make 
it possible to achieve environmental goals at a number of geographic points 
while maintaining the advantages of a market system.
4.2.3 Pollution Offsets System
Krupnick, Oates & Van De Verg (1983) examine several alternative 
forms of marketable pollution permit systems for controlling air pollution. 
In particular they examine how the spatial aspects of pollution location and 
dispersion can be accommodated within a marketable pollution permit system. 
They propose a system of 'pollution offsets' that has the capacity to achieve 
predetermined air quality standards at minimum aggregate abatement cost, while 
making comparatively modest demands on pollution sources and on the regulatory
agency. Significantly they find that the USEPA Emissions Trading Policy 
provides a framework for the introduction of a marketable air—pollution permit 
system. Although their paper addresses air pollution, the analysis is also 
relevant to controlling water pollution.
To clear up some confusion in the literature Krupnick & others 
(1983) commence by presenting a benchmark case for a prototype ambient-based 
permit system (APS) of marketable air-pollution permits (following Montgomery 
(1972)) illustrating the spatial problem • In this case the MPPs are defined 
in terms of pollutant concentrations at the receptor points and the regulatory 
agency has to specify the transfer coefficients for each source of 
pollution. As the environmental objective is to obtain set levels of ambient 
air quality at each receptor point within a region, the cost minimisation 
problem becomes one of finding a vector of emissions from all the stationary 
sources in the region and attaining a set of predetermined pollution standards 
at the lowest aggregate cost, subject to the constraint that the prescribed 
standards are met at each of the receptor points. Montgomery (1972) has 
demonstrated that this vector of emissions does exist and that the emission 
vector and shadow prices that emerge from the minimisation problem satisfy the 
same set of conditions as do the vectors of emissions and prices for 
marketable air-pollution permits for a competative equilibrium in such a 
market. Having established this benchmark case, Krupnick & others (1983) note 
two points. First, such a system is attractive to regulatory agencies because 
information on abatement costs is not required. They can either issue the 
prescribed number of MPPs at each receptor point or make an initial allocation 
of MPPs to existing polluters, and in a competitive setting subsequent 
transactions would establish the cost-minimising solution. Second however, 
this system would have high transaction costs for polluters because each 
polluter will have to assemble a portfolio of MPPs for every receptor point 
that its emissions affect. Note that each polluter will have to operate in a 
number of markets for each pollutant and is subject to different trading 
coefficients in each market.
An alternative approach in the literature is the marketable 
emission-based permit system (EPS) where MPPs are defined in terms of levels 
of emissions rather than in terms of the effects of the emissions on ambient 
air quality. In this approach use is made of a system of emission zones (for 
example airsheds) in which emissions of a particular pollutant are treated as
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equivalent. The regulatory agency sets the allocation of MPPs for each zone, 
and polluters within a zone can trade MPP's on a one-to-one basis but not 
between zones. Each zone is a separate market with its own price for MPPs 
determined by the demand for permits by polluters and the supply of permits 
set by the regulatory agency. Regardless of the number of zones, each 
pollution source will be located in only one zone and will consequently 
operate in only one MPP market for a given pollutant. It is this last feature 
that makes the emission-based system approach attractive to polluters in terms 
of lower transactions costs, as well as avoiding the specification of transfer 
co-efficients to individual polluters.
Although an emission-based system may simplify life for polluters, 
it places considerable burden on the regulatory agencies to find the least 
cost solution. Besides the air-modelling data required for an APS system, the 
regulatory agency must have source-specific abatement costs data because 
polluters with varying dispersion coefficients are grouped into the same zone 
and one-f or-one trades of MPPs will not reflect the differences in the 
concentrations contributed by their respective emissions. As a result the 
price of each polluter's emissions will not match the shadow price of the 
binding pollution constraint. Additional difficulties include the need to 
continually readjust the allocation of MPPs within zones and the possibility 
that a particular system of zones may prevent one polluter from making 
beneficial trades with another polluter located in a different zone. Provided 
that dispersion characteristics for emissions within zones are similar, these 
problems may not be serious. Thus although an increase in the number of zones 
can reduce excess pollution abatement costs associated with an EPS, such an 
increase in the number of zones would restrict the number of polluters in each 
market with a consequent reduction in market competitiveness for MPPs together 
with more uncertainty about prices for MPPs•
A more significant difficulty for the regulatory agency is the 
allocation of MPPs between zones. With inadequate information, the allocation 
of MPPs between zones may fail to attain ambient air quality standards with a 
consequence that the regulatory agency may need to intervene in the market. 
The possible need for interventions makes the system cumbersome and creates 
uncertainty. This situation is further complicated by the need for 
adjustments due to dynamic changes over time between and within zones. 
Krupnick & others (1983) conclude that emission-based MPP schemes with their
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use of zones is not practical from a regulatory agency point of view because 
of the inherent administrative difficulties and suffers from the difficulty of 
obtaining the least-cost pattern of emissions.
As described above, both ambient-based and emission-based MPP 
systems have troublesome properties. Krupnick & others (1983) propose a 
conceptual hybrid alternative which has certain characteristics of both 
approaches. The hybrid approach uses MPPs defined in terms of emissions and 
allowing the sale of these MPPs between polluters (but not on a one-to-one 
basis), however the transfer of MPPs among polluters is subject to the 
restriction that such transfers do not result in violation of the set ambient 
air quality standard at any receptor point. In effect any source of new, or 
expanded, emissions must obtain a sufficient number of emission-based MPPs 
from existing sources to 'offset' the impacts of the new emissions on 
pollutant concentrations in such a way that the pollution constraint is 
everywhere satisfied. Krupnick & others name this general approach to MPPs as 
a pollution offsets system (POS).
The hybrid nature of their POS approach is as follows. Like EPS, it 
involves the trading of MPPs which are not associated specifically with a 
particular receptor market as under APS. Also it reflects the APS in that the 
ratio at which MPPs exchange for one another depends on the relative effects 
of the associated emissions on ambient air quality at the receptor points.
They find that the Montgomery system of emission licences described 
above is a special case of their pollution offset system having a very 
restrictive non-degradation condition that requires any MPP trading between 
polluters to result in no increase in pollutant concentrations at any receptor 
point. By technical argument Krupnick & others show that this condition is 
unnecessarily restrictive and generates an outcome that, for many initial 
allocations of MPPs, will not coincide with the least-cost solution. Their 
modification to Montgomery's restrictive condition is simply to require the 
source of new emissions to induce existing polluters to reduce their emissions 
by amounts sufficient to prevent violations at any receptor point (i.e. new 
sources obtain offsetting savings from existing polluters). In their 
pollution-offset system firms are free to buy and sell marketable pollution 
permits subject only to the constraint that there result no violations of the 
set ambient standards of air quality at any receptor point. The authors 
conclude that the trading equilibrium coincides with the least-cost solution
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irrespective of the initial allocation of emission permits as occurs under 
APS.
This situation is illustrated in Figure 4.1. Curve C, is the iso­
cost curve for pollution abatement costs (assumes a schedule of rising 
marginal abatement costs). Line FG indicates the pollution constraint 
associated with Receptor a (the slope of the line equals the ratio of the 
transfer co-efficients - i.e. the rate at which emissions from Source Two can 
substitute for emissions from Source One with no change in pollution 
concentrations at Receptor a). Similarly line LM depicts the pollution 
constraint for Receptor Ja. The combinations of emissions from Source One and 
Source Two that satisfy the pollution constraint is the set of points OLAG. 
The least-cost solution occurs at E* at which point the ratio of marginal 
abatement costs equals the ratio of the transfer coefficients. Suppose for
example that our initial point was E, , where E^, = (e]^>e2^) and X* = (e^*,
*
62*) are the emissions vectors corresponding to E^ and E respectively.
Source Two would pay Source One to reduce its emissions from e; to e^ , which 
would enable Source Two to increase its emissions from 62* to 62*. This 
transaction would, at the same time, move the system directly from E^ to E 
and exhaust the potential gains from trading in MPPs.
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Figure 4.1; Pollution Offsets System
Emissions from 
Source Two (e2
Receptor a
Receptor b
Emissions from 
Source One )
Source:
Krupnick & others (1983, Figure 2)
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In addition their pollution offsets system should require fewer 
transactions than under APS because a polluter would only need to acquire 
sufficient MPPs from other polluters so as to prevent any violations of air 
quality standards. The determination of acceptability for such a trade by the 
regulatory agency would involve a straightforward procedure making use of an 
air quality model. The procedure would be to enter a new emissions vector 
(incorporating the proposed addition to emissions and subtracting the 
offsetting reductions) into the model and examine through a simulation 
exercise the projected effects on pollutant concentrations at each of the 
receptor points.
The choice of a MPP system which minimises abatement, transaction 
and administrative costs depends on the characteristics of the particular 
pollutant and the geographic setting. In the special case of perfect mixing 
of emissions, the three MPP systems discussed by Krupnick & others (1983) 
collapse into one - since there will only be one receptor point and dispersion 
characteristics are identical, the APS scheme will have one market and MPPs 
will be traded on an one-to-one basis. This is the same as an EPS scheme with 
a single zone covering the entire airshed or as a pollution offsets scheme in 
which sources wishing to increase emission by one unit will have to induce any 
other source in the airshed to reduce its emissions by one unit. The 
simplicity of this special case promises considerable savings in transaction 
costs for both polluters and regulatory agencies. An example of this special 
case would be the control of chlorofluorocarbons (CFCs) which are considered 
to be a global pollutant. Even for cases that deviate somewhat from perfect 
mixing, Krupnick & others suggest that the potential savings in transactions 
costs may exceed the 'excess' abatement costs from the failure to make finer 
spatial distinctions. For example USEPA hydrocarbon emission modelling 
procedures allow one-for-one trades over a wide area. This may also be the 
situation for BOD discharges to water and for sulphate emissions. For such 
cases, the optimal system is likely to be the special case. As can be seen 
there is a tradeoff between savings in pollution abatement costs and the 
higher transaction and administrative costs of finer spatial distributions.
Moving away from the perfect mixing situation, the excess pollution 
abatement costs from ignoring spatial differences tends to increase. The 
spatial pattern of emissions of particulates and nitrogen oxides is important 
and there is a need to choose the most cost-effective MPP Scheme. The hybrid
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nature of the pollution offsets MPP scheme overcomes the disadvantages of APS 
and EPS systems noted earlier and can ensure that predetermined levels of air 
quality are met at a given and fixed set of receptor points. However for 
pollutants with more localised effects (and this includes most of the 
'criteria' air pollutants in USA) it is possible for changing spatial patterns 
of emissions to generate 'black spots' that may not coincide with designated 
receptor points. This has implications for achieving set ambient air quality 
levels at all locations (e.g. the US NAAQS, or the set ambient air quality 
standards in Victoria or the Australian NH & MRC guidelines). To prevent such 
black spots, a relatively fine mesh of receptor points will be needed implying 
comparatively high transaction costs under an APS system or small zones (and 
thus thin markets) under an EPS system. In addition, since under the APS 
system each receptor is associated with an individual permanent market, 
receptor points would tend to become 'institutionalised'. Moving receptor 
points to take account of new pollution patterns would lead to legal, 
administrative and market dislocation difficulties and would not rule out the 
need for future adjustments. This problem is easily resolved under a 
pollution offsets scheme because there is no need to institutionalise the 
receptor points. The regulatory agency can adopt air quality modelling 
procedures that can effectively identify the location of the worst air quality 
for each individual MPP transation.
The transaction costs involved in a pollution offset type of MPP 
scheme would generally be lower in air quality management than for an ambient 
pollution permit scheme because in the latter situation pollution sources 
would typically require many transactions to build up a portfolio of permits 
for each of a number of monitoring points that their emissions impact. Under 
a pollution offsets scheme a pollution source would require only a few trades 
and in some cases only one, as well as reducing administrative costs for the 
regulatory agency.
Addressing the question of implementation of a MPP scheme, Krupnick 
& others (1983) note that the USEPA has introduced regulatory reforms that 
bear a close resemblance to their pollution offset scheme, as does the State 
of Wisconsin transferable discharge permit (TDP) scheme for controlling BOD 
water pollution. These innovations in air pollution control are components of 
the USEPA's Emission Trading Policy and are described in more detail in 
Chapter five. Details on TDPs schemes in relation to water pollution follow
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in Chapter six. The authors caution that while the framework created under 
the USEPA Emission Trading Policy establishes the potential for creating MPP 
systems which could realise much of the cost savings, each US State government 
still must specify the exact nature of their MPP system. The USEPA policy 
sets only the legal framework, not a fully specified system. It is the 
details of the design and implementation of these systems that will determine 
the success or otherwise of such schemes. They also note that certain 
statutory provisions under the US Clean Air Act (and indeed under the Clean 
Water Act also) and other additional regulatory requirements, prevent the 
realisation of all the cost savings, even if all the implementation problems 
were resolved. They conclude that it is reassuring that the USEPA has 
adopted, in principle, the most promising approach to the design of MPP 
systems and that a number of US State governments are moving to the detailed 
design of MPP systems.
The important point to note here is the remarkable convergence 
between recent theoretical and practical approaches to controlling both water 
and air pollution. The MPP concept is being actively experimented with in USA 
as we shall see from the next Chapters. However there is a need to make some 
changes to legislation and regulatory procedures before the potential cost 
savings of MPP schemes can be fully realised.
4.2.4 Types of Marketable Pollution Permits
Tietenberg (1980) delineates the following types of marketable 
pollution permit systems and their key features:
(i) Undifferentiated
. conveys the same entitlement to emit pollutants to every emitter
. transfers of permits are on a one-to-one basis
(ii) Differentiated
(A) Ambient Pollution Permit System (APS)
. defines allowable emissions in terms of pollutant concentrations at a 
set of receptor points 
. transaction costs could be quite high
. market equilibrium coincides with the least-cost solution for 
attaining any predetermined level of environment quality, and does so 
for any initial allocation of permits.
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(B) Emission Pollution Permit System (EPS)
• confers directly the right to emit pollutants up to a specified rate
a special condition is necessary on the trading of permits (in fact a
very restrictive non-degradation requirement) for the initial
allocation of permits to ensure the market equilibrium is the least
cost solution.
To this differentiated category we add:
(C) Hybrid Pollution Permit System
is the pollution offset system (POS) conceived by Krupnick & others
(1983)
combines the attractive features of both the APS and EPS approaches
the modification to the restrictive condition in (B) above is to
require the source of new emissions to induce existing polluters to
reduce their emissions by amounts sufficient to prevent violations at
any receptor point (i.e. new sources obtain offsetting savings from 
existing polluters)
the trading equilibrium coincides with the least-cost solution
irrespective of the initial permit allocations
systems resembling this hybrid permit design have been introduced in
the USA for both air and water pollution control, however
technological constraints in their existing legislation prevent the 
full potential benefits being obtained from these schemes.
4.2.5 Management of Storable Pollutants
OLee has investigated possibilities where pollutants may be stored
for a period of time and later released into the environment when adverse 
effects are minimal. The treatment and storage of pollutants before their 
release into the environment is a critical part of many abatement programs. 
Importantly he found that when storage is possible, optimal pollution 
abatement is not achieved using a time sequence of fixed per-unit pollution 
charges set equal to the marginal social cost of pollution. Two problems 
occur with fixed pollution charges. First, firms undervalue storage capacity 
and may build facilities that are too small because they do not capture all of 
the social benefits from storing pollutants. Second, an indeterminancy exists 
in that the firm is indifferent to various emission paths, and there is no 
assurance the socially optimal path will be chosen (these indeterminancies
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arise because storage allows for the 'smoothing' of pollution charges over 
time, such that the present value marginal cost of pollution charges in each 
time period is the same).
Following this result Lewis (1981) suggests the use of a particular 
system where MPPs, entitling firms to discharge a set quantity of pollution in 
each time period, are traded in a competitive market. Lewis proposed a 
variation to the Dales (1968) pollution rights market concept which provides 
for storing of pollutants and which incorporates the Baumol & Oates (197 5) 
'standards approach' to establish total discharge rights for each period. He 
finds an important difference between pollution charges and MPPs approaches. 
With the MPP approach there is indeterminancy at the firm level, but at the 
aggregate level the response of all firms is dictated by market forces which 
ensure pollution is reduced by the desired amount. Lewis concludes that, 
unlike a pollution charges approach, a pollution rights market can produce the 
optimal pollution generation-storage-discharge program and that prescribed 
standards are realised at least cost.
4.3 REGIONAL EFFICIENCY AND COST DISTRIBUTION ASPECTS
The regional efficiency and cost distributional properties of five 
types of policies for stationary source air pollution abatement are being 
assessed by Spofford, Paulsen & Russell (1983) through the use of a regional 
model and using 1970 base year data on costs, prices and emissions with the 
intent of exploring strategic management issues. In their Chapter four they 
examine the costs of controlling sulphur dioxide emissions in the eleven 
county Lower Delaware Valley region of USA - a heavily industrialised region 
with non-uniform atmospheric dispersion characteristics. The most critical 
ambient air quality receptor point was the Philadelphia area. The policies 
investigated include two direct (command and control) regulations - 
technology-based emission standards (the current US air pollution control 
policy), and a uniform percentage reduction in emissions; and three economic 
incentives - uniform pollution charges, marketed ambient quality permits 
(APS), and marketed emission permits (EPS). Both single zone and multiple 
zone application is examined for each policy. Two analytical conditions were 
adopted. Firstly a uniform pollution reduction policy was imposed. Secondly, 
in relation to the two MPP systems, the control of area sources of sulphur
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dioxide in the region (from home and commercial space heating activities) is 
based on practical . rather than regional economic efficiency considerations,
i.e. by imposing limits on the sulphur content of fuels.
The authors note that the marketable emissions permit policy has two 
troublesome characteristics relating to (a) the difficulty of initially 
setting the total allowable emissions which are neither too strict nor too lax 
for the region and (b) given this difficulty, the regulatory agency will need 
data on emissions, atmospheric dispersion, and marginal costs of control at 
all sources in the region as well as a substantial analytical capacity just to 
establish total allowable emissions for the region (unless adjustments in 
total allowable emissions (up or down) are permitted to be made after the 
initial round of emission permit trading has been completed although this 
would be economically inefficient). The authors note their analysis results 
suggest that it is unlikely the marketable emission permit policy, even the 
single zone version of this policy, can avoid the information requirements of 
the pollution charges policy, as most analysts have asserted. In practice the 
flexibility of regulatory agencies to change total allowable emission needs to 
be maintained irrespective of the type of pollution policy in place when 
circumstances warrant. In writing the rules for MPP systems (such as those 
proposed in Maryland USA) the procedures for such changes must be clearly 
spelt out prior to the implementation of such systems to reduce future 
uncertainty.
From their analysis of control costs, total emissions, and the 
resulting ambient quality, and on consideration of the information needs of 
the regulatory agency to design and implement specific policies, the authors 
find that the leading candidates for the control of sulphur dioxide emissions 
in the Lower Deleware Valley, would be the marketable ambient quality permit 
policy and the eleven zone marketable emissions permit policy. These findings 
are based on cost distributional considerations (i.e. on the basis of major 
categories of polluters or on their locations) for the design of an initial 
distribution of permits for both policies, and on regional efficiency 
considerations for determining total allowable emissions for zones for the 
emission permit policy.
Another measure of the effectiveness of sulphur dioxide pollution 
source control policies, especially policies designed for the single 
pollutants, is the impacts they have on the discharge of other emissions and
effluents. In fact sulphur dioxide abatement equipment also abates emissions 
of particulates to some extent. The authors suggest that emission control 
policies for either sulphur dioxide or particulates should be integrated.
Given the current concern about acid rain problems some areas may 
face a new pollution limitation - reduction of total emissions of sulphur 
dioxide in addition to meeting a regional ambient air quality standard. The 
authors suggest that to meet both objectives simultaneously, the eleven zone 
effluent charge, the ambient quality permit and the emission permit would be 
preferred as more efficient.
The major policy implication emerging from the results of the 
authors' analyses of regional efficiency in this part of their study is 
support for the marketable ambient quality permit policy in preference to the 
marketable emission permit policy, and support for these two policies in 
preference to the other policies analysed. Although there are considerable 
information requirements in the design of a regionally efficient emission 
permit policy, the authors believe the cost of such requirements are far 
outweighed by the cost savings associated with improved efficiency. Indeed 
much of this capability already exists in regulatory agencies in their 
administration of direct command-and-control pollution abatement activities.
Notes;
1. The term 'pollution entitlements' is preferred to 'pollution rights' 
because this emphasises the fact that these entitlements should not be 
considered to be absolute rights in perpetuity, but are granted to 
polluters by society through their government and are subject to 
government discretion in relation to the management of environmental 
quality.
2. For example, in Tietenberg (1980, pp. 405-6) vrtiere the Montogmery proposal 
for 'emission licences' is misinterpreted as system of zones where permits 
are traded on a one-for-one basis.
3. Lee, D.R., 'Intertemporal environment management with a storable 
pollutant'. Journal of Environmental Economics and Management (in 
press). As quoted in Lewis (1981).
CHAPTER 5
EMISSION TRADING POLICIES FOR 
AIR POLLUTION ABATEMENT IN THE UNITED STATES
Environmental agencies in the United States have tended to use a 
standards-based approach to controlling pollution. For the purposes of 
regulation, each process or facility within a plant has been treated 
separately. This approach does not take account of the fact that the addition 
of pollution abatement equipment can be easy for some processes or facilities 
but difficult and expensive on others. Such an approach leaves decision­
makers little room in which to find cost-effective solutions to control 
pollution.
Recent economic conditions have led to a closer economic scrutiny of 
environmental protection policies. In the United States the Environmental 
Protection Agency (USEPA) began in 197 6 to explore ways to make pollution 
control less costly while stimulating progress toward cleaner air. These 
investigations by the USEPA have led to the establishment of the Emission 
Trading Policy that provided the legal framework for a 1 market mechanism' to 
operate to stimulate managers of pollution sources toward achieving greater 
economic efficiency in meeting environmental regulations. The purposes of the 
Emission Trading Policy according to the USEPA (1980a, 1980b, 1980c) are to:
(i) allow firms to achieve savings in current pollution abatement 
expenditure
(ii) make extra pollution control profitable
(Hi) remove current barriers to innovation
(iv) remove governments from time-wasting arguments over affordability
(v) improve profits through lower cost pollution control
(vi) contribute to economic growth through lowering costs
(vii) assist governments by reducing enforcement burdens and enabling 
pollution control to be achieved at less cost to the industries in 
their jurisdiction.
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At present, the marginal cost of air pollution abatement varies 
significantly across industries and within specific regions. For example one 
US study referred to by the US Council on Environmental Quality (USCEQ 1983) 
has found that the cost of control for hydrocarbons ranged from US$16,500 per 
tonne for a large spray painting operation in an automobile factory to US$41 
per ton for a gasoline terminal in the same region. This same study found the 
cost of controls to vary by as much as 50% for the same point sources within 
the same facility. It can thus be seen that market-based opportunities such 
as marketable pollution permits for cleaning the air and reducing air 
pollution abatement costs at the same time do exist.
Using linear programming techniques, Atkinson & Tietenberg (1982a) 
have modelled the control of particulates under APS and EPS strategies in St 
Louis. Compared with the existing command and control regulations they find 
an order-of-magnitude reduction in local control costs under an APS strategy 
and a factor of five reduction under an EPS strategy.
In a related study of the same area and pollutant, Atkinson & 
Tietenberg (1982b) discuss efficiency and financial burden aspects. They 
found that the APS approach dominates the EPS on efficiency grounds but tends 
to place a greater control cost burden on fewer pollution sources. They also 
found that an initial auction of MPPs significantly increases the number of 
pollution sources which are financially adversely affected as compared to a 
free issue of MPPs (a similar conclusion is reached by Lyon (1982)).
If it were possible for one firm to trade portions of its allowable 
emissions (as stated in its permit or licence) to another firm, a reduced 
level of high-cost control in one location could be balanced with additional 
low-cost control in other firms in the same region. Trading in this context 
has been shown to achieve substantial cost savings. Tietenberg (1980) and 
Krupnick & others (1983) provide useful surveys of the literature relating to 
studies of static cost savings from MPP scheme proposals.
Hahn (1982) cautions that there have not been any comprehensive 
dynamic studies of cost-savings expected from proposed MPP schemes and that in 
static cost-savings studies the demand for MPPs has been assumed without 
allowing for uncertainty, thus leading to a possible upward bias in results.
Emissions Trading systems combine the market forces that stimulate 
innovations in controlling pollution with the direct regulatory elements that 
form the basis of a 'command and control* system. The current USEPA Emissions 
Trading Policy consists of four different components: bubbles, offsets, 
banking and netting. The program is still under development. In this 
discussion of the US experience, in each of the market incentive based 
strategies, it must be remembered that the direct command and control 
regulatory legal framework remains in place to establish, at a minimum the 
pollution control baseline. These incentive strategies are to complement 
existing requirements.
5.1 BUBBLE POLICY
The US Clean Air Act established a direct 'command and control' 
regulatory system that established point-by-point control levels of air 
emissions. Under the bubble concept developed by the USEPA, firms are 
encouraged to combine the emissions from their numerous outlets to define the 
emissions limitation for the entire facility, and then to develop their own 
strategies for different levels of control at different sources, as long as 
the entire plant within the bubble stays inside the overall emissions 
ceiling. For example, managers can 'over-control' relatively large 
smokestacks, when this can be accomplished inexpensively, in exchange for 
reduced control requirements on smaller, relatively more expensive valves or 
similar outlets. This is illustrated in Figure 5.1. The bubble was the 
initial form of an economic incentive-based control instrument, but by itself 
it has provided limited incentives for pollution reduction beyond the minimum 
requirements of the law. Once firms reached the ceiling defined by the 
bubble, they have no incentive to reduce their emissions further. Subsequent 
refinements of the bubble policy have extended the opportunities for using 
these incentives (see USEPA 1982b). In essence the bubble policy has 
redefined what is a pollution source. The policy requires plants to 
demonstrate that alternative controls they propose are equivalent to existing 
requirements in terms of air quality and enforceability.
The bubble policy will primarily benefit complex industrial sources 
with a number of emission points. Thus the bubble policy gives firms greater 
flexibility to meet air pollution abatement requirements. The bubble policy 
has safeguards to protect human health and the environment. For example,
46
plants using this approach may not relax controls on hazardous pollutants in 
exchange for increasing controls on less toxic pollutants, and may not hamper 
or delay the enforcement of USEPA or State clean-up requirements.
One example of a large bubble is the Du Pont Company's chemical 
plant in New Jersey. Instead of lowering the emissions of volatile organic 
compounds (smog precursors) by 85% from each of the plant's 112 stacks, it 
reduced the compounds from the plant's seven largest stacks by 99% through 
incineration. This rearrangement of pollution controls not only saved the 
Company US $10 million, it also achieved better overall pollution reduction, 
with the average pollution reduction per stack now 90%'*'. USEPA (undated) 
gives a description of a number of representative bubbles.
Figure 5.1: Bubble Policy
USE OF THE BUBBLE CAM REDUCE COMPLIEMCE COSTS OF A FIRM
Emission Control Costs:
Plant A $ 5,000 per ton 
Plant B $ 15,000 per ton
After Use of Bubble 
Total Allowed Emissions: 200 tons 
Control Costs : $1.5 Million
tons
tons; •
Before Use of Bubble 
Total Allowed Emissions: 200 tons 
Control Costs : $ 2 Million
/rYpp ;i:
/:■ i 00 : -:TD I: '■:: toilSjr
Source:
USEPA (1982a, p.3).
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5.2 OFFSETS POLICY
The USEPA*s Emissions Trading Policy opens new avenues to innovative 
environmental strategies once firms have controlled emissions as required by 
law. Firms that reduce their pollutant emissions more than required through 
approved programs can gain emission reduction credits (ERCs), which may be 
held for the firm’s own current or future expansion, or traded with another 
firm in the region. The initial ceiling levels are determined in accord with 
existing permits specified in State Implementation Plans or applicable 
technology-based performance standards. These regulatory standards still 
provide constraints on the creation, use, and trade of ERCs. Once a 
participating firm has gained ERCs by reducing its pollution below the legal 
ceiling, it can use these excess reductions as offsets. Offsetting is the 
administrative procedure that provides for trading in discharge permits 
between firms among activities not in the same plant or not owned by the same 
firm. Offsetting requires a greater than one-for-one reduction in discharges 
to achieve net improvements in ambient air quality (see USEPA 1980c). The 
offsets policy was primarily designed to permit industrial growth in polluted 
areas (known as non-attainment areas) to the benefit of both new and existing 
air pollution sources. It lets new sources locate in polluted areas if the 
new arrivals pay (or arrange) for existing sources to reduce their emissions 
below required levels in amounts sufficient to counter those emitted by the 
new arrival. The new firm has to secure reductions (by acquiring ERCs) which 
are more than equivalent to its emissions after installation of its own air 
pollution abatement equipment. This is illustrated in Figure 5.2. The policy 
can stimulate innovation (as well as air quality progress) by making it 
profitable for firms to find new ways to control emissions more than the law 
currently requires. Also unregulated sources are encouraged to begin 
voluntary controls that a new source can use for offsetting trades.
The offsets amendments (USEPA 1982b) to the US Clean Air Act 
regulations require that before a company may construct or expand a major 
polluting plant in an area that has not met any of the US national ambient air 
quality standards (for emissions of particulates, sulphur dioxide, oxides of 
nitrogen, hydrocarbons volatile organic compounds, or carbon monoxide) air 
pollution in the area has to be reduced by more than the amount that the new 
pa.ntr or addition would generate. Sources subject to this examination are
49
Figure 5.2: Offsets Policy
OFFSETS ALLOW INDUSTRIAL EXPANSION 
IN NONATTAINMENT AREAS
BEFORE OFFSET 
Total Allowed Emissions; 
200 tons __
Emissions of existing firm
AFTER OFFSET 
Total Allowed Emissions; 
200 tons __
tons
Existing firm reduces emissions to create 
offset so that new firm can locate
Source:
USEPA (19 8 lh, p.4).
50
major stationary sources of air pollution (i.e. those emitting more than 100 
tons per year of any criteria air pollutant). These regulations limit offset 
trading to emissions of the same type.
5.3 BANKING POLICY
Emissions banking enables firms to 'bank' their ERCs and receive 
credit for discharge reductions achieved in excess of applicable legal 
requirements. The USEPA has approved transactions involving air pollution 
entitlements in a number of limited regional markets, but has maintained 
administrative controls that limit the market in these trades. The banking 
policy is the hub of the Emission Trading system and forms the basis of a true 
market. It converts approved bubble and offset arrangements from a barter 
economy to a money market. After having their greater-than-required emission 
reduction credits quantified and certified, sources can have these ERCs banked 
(i.e. stored) for their own future use or for sale to others. So sources can 
choose to meet air pollution control requirements by either installing more 
controls or changing internal processes or acquiring ERCs from others that can 
produce them more cheaply. This is illustrated in Figure 5.3. Thus the 
banking policy can benefit all firms (in clean as well as polluted areas) by 
decreasing the uncertainty about air pollution control expenditures and 
lowering search and transaction costs for firms.
Emissions banking is an administrative process which defines how 
emission reductions can be certified and stored in a legally-protected manner 
for later use in bubble, netting, or offset trades. Such banks establish a 
fixed legal status for ERCs, create a pool of readily-identified credits, make 
inter-firm trades practicable, and reduce the perceived level of risk and 
uncertainty associated with emission trades which attempt to use uncertified 
emission reductions. The absence of a bank does not preclude trading. 
However, the existence of a bank facilitates trading by lowering the 
transactions costs and reducing risks either for firms which might trade to 
meet pollution control requirements more flexibly and easily, or for those 
which might create some ERC's for quick sale. The banking provisions are 
explained more fully in USEPA (1980d) which is a manual guiding the 
establishment of a banking systems. A manual for a prototype emissions 
banking and trading record-keeping system has been prepared by American 
Management Systems Inc. (1982).
51
Fiourc 5.5: Emission Reduction Credit Banking Policu
EMISSION REDUCTION BANKING ALLOWS FIRMS TO REDUCE 
EMISSIONS NOW AND EITHER USE THE CREDITS LATER OR 
SELL THEM TO ANOTHER FIRM
tons
ABC Company 
creates an excess 
emission reduction
ABC Company 
certifies the 
emission reduction 
credit (ERC) with 
the air pollution 
control agency
Central 
Registry 
of ERCs
The ERC is entered into 
the Central Registry.
The certification process" 
protects the value of the 
emission reduction.
ABC can use ERCs in a 
bubble, in offset 
applications, to net out 
of new source review 
process or to sell to 
other firms.
BUBBLE
OFFSET EXPANSION
1O0 tons;
SC1I. TO OTHER FIRMS
lOO tons
Source:
USEPA 098Hi, pp. 8-9)
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5.4 NETTING
The current USEPA Emissions Trading Policy also provides for 
netting. Netting in similar to offsetting, with the difference that netting 
applies to firms that must reduce some pollutants from certain sources to 
enable them to expand the use of other sources of the same pollutant. The 
netting provision excuses plants expanding or modernising in clean air areas 
or in non-attainment areas from new source review requirements so long as the 
expansion or modernisation does not produce a significant 'net* increase in 
plant-wide emissions. Netting is accompanied by ensuring that any emission 
increase is compensated for by surplus reductions elswhere in the plant. 
Under the terms of a recent court decision netting can only be used in 
attainment areas.
5.5 STATUS OF IMPLEMENTATION
There have been claims by some industrialists and economists in 
America that markets established under USEPA's Emission Trading Policy have 
failed. However Palmisano (1983a,b) suggests that these claims are premature, 
and that according to economic theory about the diffusion of innovations and 
reasonable expectations, the evolution and performance of such markets has 
been successful. Smoothly working competitive markets take time to develop, 
but already significant trades are occurring despite high transaction costs 
and continued uncertainty about regulatory requirements. The Emissions 
Trading Policy Statement (USEPA 1982b) organised, in one document, the logic 
and administrative procedures for generating, certifying, storing, and using 
an emission reduction credit (ERG).
As mentioned previously, ERCs are emission decreases beyond that 
required by law and certified by the regulatory agency to be surplus, 
permanent, quantifiable and enforceable. It should be noted that all trades 
in ERCs are not the same in terms of uncertainty, complexity and perceived 
risk to user firms. In general, the more complex a transaction, the more risk 
a firm will see in that trading option. Nevertheless firms will become less 
risk—averse the more a given type of ERG trade is used. Trading activity will 
depend on the kinds of institutions which support trading, on economic 
conditions and on the mix of resident industry.
Development of an ERG market differs from the operation of such a 
market. Markets typically develop when buyers and sellers meet to profit from
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exchange, although transaction costs may still be high. As markets develop, 
buyers and sellers look for price certainty and a standardised product. 
Palmisano suggests that diffusion of the ERG regulatory innovation will follow 
a logistic or S-shaped curve. The successful introduction and operation of an 
ERC market requires accelerated diffusion of the regulatory innovation. The 
desired objective is to move the curve upwards to the left, ie. to obtain more 
market participants over a shorter period of time - as shown in Figure 5.4.
In a developing market supply will be unstable. Short-term
price/quantity relationships may not be good predictors of future 
relationships because :
(i) early market participation would be biassed by uncertainty and 
novalty
(ii) without institutions which provide accurate information to market 
participants, secondary information markets (e.g. brokers or 
consultants) will develop and will add an extra cost to each trade
(iii) it would be expected that the first firms to participate will be 
those for vrtiom the net benefits are greatest.
Without futures markets, options contracts and formal ERC banks protecting 
ERC generators from having credits confiscated, or altered in some way, firms 
are unlikely to participate in market-developing activities.
For ERC markets to develop, firms (and individuals in these firms) must 
believe the expected benefits they obtain from participating will be greater 
than the expected benefits obtained by not doing anything. Another factor 
affecting firm-level decisions to participate is that decisions which affect 
profits have been found to be analysed differently from those decisions which 
minimise costs (even though profit and cost are directly related) by different 
individuals in a firm, e.g. the environmental manager is located in the cost 
centres of firms and are not rewarded for risk-taking. In summary, the 
successful introduction of ERC markets have depended on understanding the 
following three categories of factors:
(i) factors which affect individuals' decision-making within the firm
(ii) factors which affect potential suppliers and buyers of ERCs
(iii) factors which are affected by the design and administration of the 
regulatory program.
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Figure 5.4: Diffusion of Regulatory Innovation
100 X
Percentage of
potential
adopters
C« = ‘natural* diffusion
of regulatory concept 
C 2 = same as above but 
accelerated and 
supported
Ti mePoint of
concept
introduction
Source:
Palmisano (1982b, p.18).
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Palmisano supports his conceptual discussion of the diffusion of the 
regulatory innovation with details of actual experience (1983a). Over the 
last four years the bubble concept has been modified, expanding possible 
trades and reducing uncertainty. There are 23,000 major sources of air 
pollution in USA, thus the adoption of Emission Trading concept is taking time 
because the concept is complex and individuals and firms are risk—adverse. 
Hence the regulatory innovation diffusion curve is S-shaped. In addition 
information travels slowly and can be 1 impure1. The speed of adoption has 
been found to be more related to 1 profitability cushion1 needed to absorb the 
size and risk of investment in the provisions of the regulatory innovations 
rather than to the size of firms alone. The early bubble arrangements that 
have taken place must have been where the expected benefits were large (or 
certain to be approved). This factor probably explains why steel companies 
have been over-represented among early bubble schemes, for the cost savings 
over meeting inflexible and mandated technology based standards for every 
emission point are quite significant.
The successful progress of USEPA's Emission Trading Policy can be 
gauged from their status reports over these (see USEPA 1981c, 1981d, 1983). 
The situation in April 1983 was :
(i) 36 bubbles which have been approved or proposed for approval by USEPA 
directly, saving their users more than US$120 million over the cost 
of conventional controls, with many producing energy savings and 
greater emission reductions than achieved under traditional 
regulations. In addition over 150 other bubbles are under 
development at state or local level averaging over US$2 million each 
in savings in terms of capital costs and first year operating costs;
(ii) 31 different state or local rules which have been approved or under 
development which promote banking or bubbling;
(iii) since 1976, almost all US States have incorporated offset provisions 
in their legal codes and there have been at least 2000 offset 
transactions with less than 50 being between unrelated companies;
(iv) Oregon's comprehensive banking and trading rules had been approved in 
August 1982. Four other areas had full formal banking systems in 
operation, with several hundred tons of deposits and several inter­
firm trades using banked Emission Reduction Credits. At least 12
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(v)
other areas had drafted or proposed full banking provisions;
Firms in 1981 had paid up to US$1000 per ton for total suspended 
particulates offsets and US$500 per ton for hydrocarbon offsets (even 
in the absence of formal banking arrangements). One firm had paid US 
$2500 per ton for a 25 ton hydrocarbon offset permit obtained through 
a banking transaction, thus saving US $3300 per ton if itself met 
more costly uniform technology standards.
Not all trades are reported to the USEPA because state governments are 
increasingly being involved in the process.
Although USEPA still has relatively limited experience using its 
Emissions Trading Policy, they have had a substantial initial impact. Nearly 
two-thirds of the USEPA approved bubbles produced more emission reductions 
than was required. Emissions Trading has received strong support from 
President Reagan's program of regulatory reform (US Administration 1981).
Palmisano concluded that the USEPA Emission Trading Policy has 
succeeded in promoting more pollution control at lower cost. He notes that, 
excepting offsets, the USEPA Emission Trading Policy as presently formulated 
will not improve air quality as it is aimed at providing the cheapest way to 
meet air quality goals, not exceed them. (He notes that future revisions may 
require substantial net air quality improvements from some classes of emission 
trades, and instances an expected notice in the Federal Register concerning 
'shut downs'.)
The Conservation Council, an environmental lobby group, has 
indicated general support for the USEPA Emission Trading Policy (Liroff 1980, 
1981) as did the Natural Resources Defence Council . However more recently 
the Natural Resources Defence Council has started to challenge in court some 
provisions of USEPA's Emissions Trading Policy. A court decision has 
prohibited the use of 'netting' provisions in non-attainment areas. The 
ground for this sucessful challenge is that the 'netting' provisions maintain 
the status quo in pollution levels and thus do not meet one object of the 
Clean Air Act which is to reduce emissions in non—attainment areas. Further 
court decisions along these lines may jeopardise the acceptability of some 
provisions of the current Emission Trading Policy .
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5.6 TWO EXAMPLES OF PROPOSED EMISSION TRADING SCHEMES
5.6.1 South Coast Basin of California
The feasibility of a system of MPPs for controlling emissions of 
sulphur oxides in the South Coast Air Basin was examined by Cass, Hahn & Noll 
(1982) for the State of California Air Resources Board. Their report seeks to 
be a kind of manual concerning the role of alternatives for setting up markets 
for emissions permits, with the sulphate particulate problem in Los Angeles as 
a case study illustrating how the major design questions concerning emission 
permit markets options can be approached.
The major questidns are as follows:
technical (relating to issues of modelling the relationship of 
emissions to air quality and of actually achieving air quality 
targets)
structural (relating to problems that might prevent a market working 
smoothly and efficiently)
distributional (relating to the effects of an emissions market on the 
industrial structure and wealth in the region) and
legal (relating to matching legislation to the concept of a tradable 
emissions permit system).
The feasibility study attempts firstly to identify the potential 
pitfalls of a market approach to controlling air pollution, secondly, to 
determine whether these pitfalls are empirically important, and thirdly, for 
the problems that appear serious, to investigate whether-these can be avoided 
or greatly reduced by the design details of the tradable emissions permits 
system. A basic finding of the study was that only a very small increase in 
total abatement costs results from allowing all air pollution sources to trade 
permits on a one-to-one basis rather than fine tuning the system with a series 
of geographically specified submarkets.
The authors conclude that a market for emissions permits in Los 
Angeles is feasible and suggest nothing more complicated than a homogeneous, 
areawide emissions permit. To facilitate adjustment of the ceiling on 
emissions and the entry of new sources into the Basin they suggest the permits 
have a fixed duration, possibly nine years with one-third of the permits
(i)
(ii)
(iii)
(iv)
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expiring every three years. They note three methods of initial allocation of 
permits - a grandfathered system, an auction in which the state keeps the 
revenues and a new concept called a zero-revenue auction based on 
grandfathered initial allocations of the asset value of the permits. The 
authors note that the results of their study would be applicable to other 
regions having similar conditions and consider that the key features of a 
pollution problem making it amenable to a MPP approach are:
(i) the problem is likely to be solvable at reasonable costs
(ii) a sufficiently large number of sources contributing significantly to
the problem so that a competitive market can be established
(iii) emissions are or can be effectively monitored at reasonable cost, and
(iv) the existing situation, owing to the costs of compliance and
environmental degradation, is widely recognised as undesirable.
5.6.2 Maryland
A pollution offset system for controlling air pollution in the US 
State of Maryland has been proposed in a recent report (Maryland Department of 
Economic and Community Development 1982). It has been designed to meet the 
requirements of USEPA's Emission Trading Policy. In essence, the Maryland 
report proposes that a polluting firm would propose a package of emission 
reductions by existing polluters (for vdiich it presumably makes payment to the 
latter) and an increase in its own emissions subject to the restriction that 
the resulting pattern of pollutant concentrations does not violate the ambient 
air quality standards at any receptor point. This scheme is the first to be 
proposed that is designed according to the hybrid MPP scheme suggested by 
Krupnick & others (1983).
To achieve its major recommendation that Maryland institute a viable 
market approach to air pollution control from stationary sources, the report 
notes the following actions are requried so as to embed the MPP approach in 
the existing regulatory scheme:
(i) Use historical production records and USEPA's 'reasonably available
control technology' requirements to immediately establish and record 
actual baseline emission levels in units of emission/time period for 
each stationary source in non-attainment areas.
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(ii) Systematically establish baseline emission levels for sources in
attainment areas over a period of several years.
(iii) Promulgate criteria for the granting of Emission Reduction Credits 
(ERCs) to pollution sources which voluntarily reduce emission levels
below baseline levels.
(iv) Provide ERCs with unlimited lives.
(v) Should further reductions in air pollution levels be required in an
area in the future, reduce by the same percentage all emission
baseline levels and all ERCs which could affect air quality in the
area.
(vi) Include virtually all stationary sources in the trading system
regardless of the amount of emissions they produce, and seek ways to
include area and mobile sources of emissions.
(vii) Guarantee ERC holders that their ERCs will not be reduced
arbitrarily.
(viii) Grant ERCs to owners of sources that reduce emissions by shutting
down emission sources or curtailing operating rates or hours.
(ix) Generally, take all reasonable actions to assure potential traders of
ERCs that the market will be stable and viable.
(x) Establish a public record of the owners of each ERC in order to 
enable the regulatory agency to track changes of ERC ownerships and 
provide users with information about ERC trading activity and
(xi)
availability.
Establish and publish firm rules and clear procedures for using ERCs 
in bubble, offset and netting transactions.
(xii) In attainment areas emission permits be granted on a first come, 
first served basis as long as the new emissions do not violate air 
quality limits, at which time ERC trading would become necessary.
The report reviews US experience in establishing comprehensive
trading systems and notes that the systems made public so far do not establish 
efficient emission markets because they contain one or more clauses 
restricting the market in an important way. Some impose short life spans on 
ERCs, especially those derived from shutting down an emission source. Others 
restrict participation in ERG trading to owners of emission sources. None of 
the comprehensive regulations handles the treatment of ERCs during future
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emission reductions in an efficient manner.
The Maryland report's proposal for a pollution offset type of air 
pollution control system is under consideration by the State Government. As 
of March 1983 the State Governor had not reached a decision on the proposal 
and on the necessary amendments to the State's legal code that would be 
required .
5.7 SOME OTHER ASPECTS
In a situation vdiere ambient air quality conditions indicate the 
need for further reduction in emisions, under US law (as an exercise of 
eminent domain or of the police power) state or local governments can 'take' 
banked emission reduction credits (ERCs), so long as they are taken for public 
rather than private benefit. Exercise of eminent domain almost always 
requires the payment of compensation and this would only occur if the banked 
ERCs were taken to allow the construction of a public facility such as a 
municipal incinerator. Taking of all or a part of a firm's ERCs would 
otherwise be an exercise of police power, protecting public health or welfare 
from harm not perceived or projected at the time the ERCs were certified. To 
reduce the possibility of compensation claims IGF Inc. (1982) notes that 
several approaches should be observed. First, when establishing a banking 
system, set out in the banking rules the way in which ERCs may be 
diminished. Second, make clear to creators of ERCs that their pollution 
entitlements are conditional and subject to diminution in the event of further 
regulation. Third, avoid taking all of any one owner's ERCs. Fourth, ensure 
that any partial taking of ERCs occurs even-handedly, and in roughly the same 
ratio as existing sources are required to achieve further emission reductions.
Kyser (1983, p.480) notes that solar energy has potential
applications in any pollution control program, but that its most promising use 
may seem to be in nonattainment areas. It is in these areas that new and 
modified sources are likely to be stringently controlled. Thus very expensive 
pollution control may be needed, boosting the value of using solar energy to 
generate process heat or electric power for example. So a neighbouring plant 
that desires expansion could help subsidise another plant's installation of 
solar energy process heating equipment and reduce conventional fuel usage in 
order to offset the neighbouring plant's increased pollution. The same idea 
can be applied in applications of the bubble concept.
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The USEPA (1980f) is also examining the issues involved with the use 
of an averaging concept for mobile source emissions (similar to the bubble 
policy for stationary air pollution sources). Emissions averaging is proposed 
so as to enable motor vehicle manufacturers with greater flexibility in 
determining the mix of vehicles/engines to produce and the control technology 
to apply, while at the same time not allowing any degradation in air quality 
benefits derived from controlling motor vehicle emissions. Several design 
criteria are proposed for ensuring a successful averaging progress, including:
(i) must have valid legal base and affected vehicle and engine classes 
must adhere to statutory limits
(ii) must be administratively practical and compatible with existing USEPA 
programs
(iii) each class should have a fixed certification emissions level which 
must be maintained throughout model year
(iv) must give equivalent air quality benefit to a non-averaging approach 
and must not allow any substantial localised impacts
(v) should make compliance less difficult for industry and less costly 
for consumers and industry.
5.8 OTHER COUNTRIES
This Section briefly notes, to the best of the author's knowledge 
whether other countries are examining the MPP concept.
With the change in the national government in the Netherlands in 
1982 a governmental working party was established to examine regulatory reform 
options for that country's environment protection legislation^. Amongst the 
options being examined was the possibility of transferable pollution 
entitlements between companies and other organisations causing pollution (i.e. 
a system of bubbles and offsets), however there has been much argument now and 
in the past about whether increases in pollution can (or ought to be) allowed 
from some dischargers, even when some offsetting pollution reductions are 
available.
Following a case study of managing the air quality of a selected 
region in Norway, in the Netherlands and in the United States by the direct 
imposition of regulatory based discharge standards,. a recent report (OECD, 
1983, pp. 114-115) concluded that economic efficiency in air quality
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management was promoted by having greater flexibility in the application of 
constraints on individual discharges. The report then recommends greater use 
of market incentives such as emission charges and marketable discharge 
permits. Following on from this report a study now underway at OECD is 
focussing on the efficiency and effectiveness of air and water pollution 
abatement policies, including the use of the regulatory innovation of 
marketable pollution permits (see Oates 1983). This study is expected to be 
completed in 1985.
Pollution in the United Kingdom is controlled through a 'best 
practical means reasonably available' approach in the application of pollution 
control standards. However their fragmented pollution control system is under 
review^. To some extent there may be a 'bubble' like approach used in UK 
where in some cases firms are given set overall standards and then allowed to 
decide the combination of controls that will be used to meet the set 
regulatory requirements. In its delayed response to the 1976 Royal Commission 
on Environmental Pollution report on air pollution, the British Government (UK 
Department of the Environment 1982) accepted the Commission's proposal that 
there should be an integrated approach to the control of pollution. The 
approach envisaged was to extend the presently used 'best practical means' 
concept to achieve the 'best practical environmental option'. This expanded 
approach would assess the total pollution load generated by a pollution 
source, having regard to the interactions that occur in the control of 
pollution of different forms, and arriving at the best balance in terms of 
emissions and discharges to all environmental media. The aim is to choose a 
combination of measures to control pollution in the air, on land and in water 
such that a reduction is one sector of the environment does not lead to an 
unacceptable situation in another. Although not agreeing the Commission s 
recommendation for the establishment of a new and centralised pollution 
inspectorate, the British Government is seeking to improve co-ordination among 
the various control agencies.
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CHAPTER 6
TRANSFERABLE DISCHARGE PERMIT SYSTEMS FOR WATER 
POLLUTION ABATEMENT IN THE UNITED STATES
A study to develop methods of analysing several types of transferable 
discharge permit (TDP^) programs using data vhich could be collected by a
typical water pollution control agency was undertaken by Eheart, Brill & Lyons 
(1982). Although the study involved simulating the use of various TDP
programs on four rivers in relation to discharges of effluents with a high
biological oxygen demand (BOD), the authors note that their findings can apply 
to many types of waterbourne pollutants besides BOD and to some extent to air 
pollutants (especially vfoen there are location-dependent environmental 
impacts). Noting that (i) in the design of a TDP program there will be 
tradeoffs between the various planning objectives of the regulatory agency 
(e.g. cost efficiency, equity, ease of implementation, water quality
maintenance and certainty of outcome), (ii) the system rules which achieve the 
best compromise is likely to be unique to each application depending on the 
nature of the water course and on decision-maker preferences, and (iii) the 
numbers, types and locations of dischargers, the authors ' TDP program overview 
findings include :
(i) the simulated market solutions for static conditions for the four 
river case studies illustrate that BOD effluent permit systems (EPS) 
would be consistently more cost efficient than a uniform, direct 
regulation program.
(ii) Ambient permit systems (APS) in relation to dissolved oxygen deficit 
contributions may produce a least-cost solution and ensure that the 
water quality standard will be achieved regardless of future permit 
transfers. However in situations where it is not possible to select 
a stable defining point for such permits (which may not even coincide 
with the critical receptor point), a more complex program involving 
either a portfolio of permits for a number of defining points or 
restrictions on trading would be required.
(iii) Unrestricted transfers of permits (and therefore discharges) could 
cause violations of the water quality standard).
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(iv) The supply of permits could be restricted to ensure that a given 
water quality standard would be achieved even if the worst possible 
set of discharge locations results from future exchanges of permits.
(v) A set of rules that restricts transfers of permits could be used to 
reduce or possibly prevent violations of a standard. Several ways of
restricting trading could be used singularly or in combination - 
limiting the aggregate discharge in si±>-regions of the watercourse, 
preventing transfers across geographical boundaries (i.e. zoned 
markets), and revaluing permits automatically and uniformally when 
exchanged.
Cvi) If the geographical zone of a TDP market is too small, the number of
discharges may be small and market manipulation by a few of than may 
lead to an inefficient and inequitable allocation of rights. On the 
other hand if market zone is too large, there is a greater risk that 
water quality may be seriously impaired by transfers of permits (and 
thus discharges) to locations with greater impacts on the water 
quality at critical receptor points.
6.1 PHOSPHOROUS CONTROL PROPOSAL
While Dales described a general strategy for marketable pollution 
permit systems, few authors (except for perhaps Tietenberg (197 4) and deLucia 
(1974)) have until recently examined the problems and practicalities of 
implementing such systems. David, Eheart, Joeres & David (1980) proposed a 
system of transferable discharge permits (TDPs) for achieving phosphorus 
pollution abatement in the Wisconsin U.S.A. portion of the Lake Michigan basin 
due to concerns about eutrophication in the Great Lakes region. This study 
involved a simulation of the demand and supply for TDPs among 53 waste water 
treatment plants, and the steps involved in creating a market and its 
subsequent operations are outlined. They note the cost of introducing such a 
system to replace existing regulatory controls is twofold. The additional 
cost to the regulating agency once the system is operating is the 
administrative cost for accounting, acquiring and disseminating price 
information and legal services. The cost to regulatees is the cost of 
learning the system and entering the market to transfer permit units. They 
suggest that the benefits of a TDP system include simplified regulation, 
savings in pollution abatement costs, incentives to lower treatment costs and
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to reduce discharges at source, savings in enforcement costs, changes, in 
uncertainty and risk associated with pollution control policy, and 
accommodating economic growth and change.
The TDP is one of a range of alternative mechanisms for allocating 
the allowable pollution loading. At one extreme is direct regulation (i.e. 
require polluters to achieve a set discharge standard), at the other end is a 
TDP with permanent property rights. Intermediate possibilities include 
limited exchanges within a regulatory framework and leasable discharge 
permits. David & others list the following possibilities:
(i) Non-transferable Allocations:
Alternative 1 - direct regulation. The government allocates a share 
of the allowed loading to each discharger, giving each polluter a 
fixed period permit.
Alternative 2 - joint permits. The government allocates a permit to 
a group of dischargers and the group then decides how the allowed 
loading is divided between members.
(ii) Transferable Allocations:
Alternative 3 - TDPs with limited durations. The initial allocation 
of permitted discharge is made with fixed duration permits being 
issued to each discharger. Then the dischargers are free to transfer 
the allowable discharge among themselves. The limited duration of 
the TDPs impl-ies that the government is free to establish an 
alternative distribution of discharge rights when the present permits 
expire.
Alternative 4 - TDPs valid for all future times. TDPs may be sold as 
well as leased. At the end of the permit life, reissuance is based 
on the configuration of holdings when the permits expire. Any 
alteration in the discharge allowance rules recognises the ownership 
pattern and value established by the permits.
Use of the third alternative is proposed in David & others (1980). 
By separating the incidence of the cost of cleanup from the actual 
responsibility for the physical cleanup, the TDP allows equity to be 
considered separately from efficiency. The formula for the issuance of 
permits determines the incidence of the cost of abatement, vhich can be done
in whatever way is considered to be most equitable. The transferability
provision allows polluters to achieve an efficient allocation whatever the 
initial distributional formula. The second alternative is similar to the
system adopted in the Federal Republic of Germany by the water quality 
associations in the Ruhr area.
The first step in establishing a system of marketable pollution 
permits is to set an allowable total pollution loading for the area under
consideration and then allocate shares of this loading to the various 
dischargers. The decision to trade in permits requires a comparison of the 
internal estimated cost of pollution abatement and the cost of such permits. 
If permits are less costly than expected abatement expenditures then permits 
will be acquired and treatment will not be undertaken.
The David & others (1980) TDP proposal to control phosphorus
discharges has the following administrative framework:
(i) All point sources of phosphorus pollution would be required to hold 
TDPs equal to their allowable discharge.
(ii) The regulatory agency would allocate the desired total pollution load 
between the various community and industry discharges in the area.
(iii) Discharges with an excess of TDPs would offer them for sale (and vice 
versa). Exchange of TDPs would reallocate the pollution load so as 
to minimise the cost of attaining the desired water quality.
(iv) The penalty for exceeding the permitted discharge would be a daily 
fine of sufficient size to encourage the purchase of the TDP’s 
needed.
The proposed system could be commenced with an initial issue of TDPs, 
divided equally among permits that expire in each of the following five years, 
and reissues would be for five years. Staggering the initial issue enables 
the regulatory agency the ability to annually adjust the total discharge of 
phosphorus allowed. The TDP would specify the amount of discharge permitted, 
the period discharge is allowed and the way in viiich TDP ownership can be 
transferred (i.e. through registration with the regulatory agency).
Monitoring and enforcement actions would be based on the permit 
ownership records held by the regulatory agency• A quarterly auction is 
suggested for the market mechanism and the TDPs would be exchanged at that ever
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price vrould elicit enough bids to buy all the rights being offered. The 
initial allocation of TDPs could be according to (i) average discharge volume, 
(ii) average phosphorus influent load, (iii) design capacity, (iv) property 
value, or (v) population criteria. The authors suggest that the human 
population served by each waste water treatment plant be the basis of the 
allocation formula (given that federal US law requires that industrial users 
pay sufficient to cover the costs of industrial waste water treatment) in view 
of simplicity. As TDPs are issued for a limited period, their transfer is in 
effect a lease rather than a sale alienating the right forever. The 
allocation of TDPs to replace those retiring should be based on the same 
principle as the initial allocation.
Two discharge levels need to be specified (Tietenberg 1974): (i) a 
maximum daily load and (ii) an average of daily loads over a longer period. 
Account has to be taken of random variations but plant managers should have an 
incentive to minimise daily variations to the enhancement of water quality 
because steps taken to minimise standard deviations from the mean can be 
translated into permit sales.
Following their description of benefits of introducing their 
proposed system of TDPs for controlling phosphorus pollution, David & others 
(1980) then discuss who would benefit in terms of four interdependent groups - 
government, managers of municipal waste water treatment plants, industrial 
polluters and the general pv±>lie. They find that of these groups, only 
industrial users would be responsive to a change as they would be more 
sensitive to the potential cost savings resulting from the greater flexibility 
in the manner in tiiich they can meet pollution controls. Thus the political 
base for adopting any system for TDPs for controlling phosphorus discharges is 
likely to be limited. In this regard it is noted that like Australia running 
municipal waste water treatment plants is not a private sector function in 
USA.
In the event, the phosphorus pollution control system proposed by 
the authors has not been adopted in Wisconsin. However this early pioneering 
work led on to the establishment of a TDP system for controlling BOD pollution
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in Wisconsin.
6.2 BOD POLLUTION CONTROL
This TDP scheme for the management of water quality through the 
control of BOD pollution was designed and introduced as a state government 
rather than federal government initiative and was devised to resolve the 
problems of Wisconsin's two most polluted rivers. In September 1981 the use 
of TDPs were permitted under the State's administrative code (Chapter NR212) 
for the control of BOD on water quality—limited stream segments. David & 
Joeres (1982) provide a useful summary of the adopted TDP system and some 
observations about the use of this system in other geographic settings.
The rivers involved are a 45 miles section of the Fox River between 
Lake Winnebago and Green Bay where are located 15 pulp and paper mills and six 
municipal water-treatment plants, and 130 miles of the Upper Wisconsin River 
with a similar number and mix of dischargers. Even after complying with 
USEPA's technology-based standards the desired levels of water quality could 
not be achieved all year and further abatement efforts were needed. (Note 
that Wisconsin TDP system only applies to the abatement increment over and 
above the minimum level required by the USE PA for all dischargers). Otherwise 
the Wisconsin scheme (like Emissions Trading) is in the spirit of a pollution- 
offset system. The key features of the Wisconsin TDP system are:
(i) The assimilative capacity at each receptor point is determined by the 
daily river flow and temperature as well as adjustments for monthly 
variables related to solar radiation. In its application to the Fox 
River, the system relates to twD receptor points (the two most 
critical disolved oxygen sag points which are then used in the water 
quality model used by the regulating agency for evaluating proposed 
trades prior to granting approvals).
(ii) The initial free distribution of rights was based on 197 2 maximum 
production levels at the paper mills on the river and 1976-77 average 
wastewater generation for the various municipalities. The share of 
rights will change over time as the municipalities have first claim 
on use of reserve capacity as their population increases. The 
duration of a permit is five years.
A target water quality level of 5 ppm for dissolved oxygen (a level 
sufficient to sustain fishlife and allow recreational activities on 
the river) was set. The TDP system was designed to achieve this
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objective for all river temperature and flow combinations in all but 
the most unfavourable circumstances (i.e. on less than 0.5% of the 
days of the year).
(iv) At the very early stages of the development of this policy for 
attaining water-quality standards, the discharge sources themselves 
were active participants in the design of the overall program.
(v) Following initial allocation, sources of BOD containing discharges 
are free to trade permits among themselves sibject to certain 
conditions (including no violations of the water quality 
standards). This constraint implies that trades will not usually be 
on a one-for-one basis. Where the pollution constraint is binding, 
the source whose effluents have a relatively large impact on water 
quality at the receptor (sag) point will have to acquire TDPs from 
other discharge sources totalling an amount greater than the increase 
in its own discharge.
(vi) The TDPs are flow-temperature permits so effluent sources must adapt 
their levels of BOD discharges to river conditions. To help 
accommodate the needed temporal adjustments in levels of discharges, 
the TDP system allows for short-term leasing of permits among 
sources.
Based on their four years involvement in the development of the 
regulations for the Wisconsin TDP systems, the authors have four principal 
conclusions. Two arise out of experience and two represent an agenda for vrtiat 
must be done in the future. The conclusions suggest strategies for the 
development of TDPs in other geographic settings and the authors note that 
lack of understanding of them may account for the lack of TDP implementation 
and delays in TDP implementation.
(i) The constraints on either the regulators or the regulated means that 
there is little financial or political incentives for the Wisconsin 
TDP system (bearing in mind the limited opportunity for trading only 
occurs tfien ambient water quality conditions dictate additional BOD 
treatment).
(ii) TDPs are but a small part of the regulatory agenda, and thus their 
implementation must be part of that agenda.
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(iii) The market place does not replace the need for institutional 
adjustments that incorporate improved environmental modelling and 
changing concepts of equity.
(iv) Existing enforcement institutions and penalties are inappropriate for 
a regulatory environment in vftich TDPs allow short-term adjustments 
in discharge limits.
From these conclusions, the authors suggest that to establish TDP 
systems, discussion of creating TDP systems must be part of a broader push for 
regulatory reform. They also suggest, given limited financial incentives, 
that other incentives supporting the advocation of TDPs need to be created. 
For polluters, an important incentive is that TDPs allow flexbility in 
operation. For the regulatory agency the incentive is that TDPs enhance the 
likelihood of meeting environmental goals at reduced administrative cost. To 
sustain the operation of TDP systems in the future, the authors note that an 
institutional capability for making changes in the TDP system must be
maintained. To ensure compliance, the enforcement approach must have 
financial penalties that are immediate and large in relation to marginal
treatment costs so that there is an inducement for trading in TDPs.
As of September 1982 there had been negotiations among BOD
2dischargers about permit trading but no actual trades have taken place.
6.3 WATER BUBBLE POLICY
Following the acceptance of its Emissions Trading Policy for
controlling air pollution more cost-effect ively the USE PA has now commenced 
studies into the more extensive use of the bubble concept in other
environmental media (USCEQ 1983). With its promulgated effluent guideline 
regulating the iron and steel industry, the USEPA incorporated provisions that 
enabled limited biibling^. The Clean Water Act does not currently provide for 
trading between sources, but it does not prohibit the basic bubbling strategy 
within a plant. Any given plant may include several out falls, and the iron 
and steel guideline allows managers of iron and steel plants to exercise some 
discretion about the balance between controls within their plant. As in the 
case of air pollutants, water bubbles cannot allow violations of the overall 
effluent limitations.
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As a result of a court challenge by the Natural Resources Defence 
Council (NRDC) against the USEPA concerning some provisions of the guidelines 
and standards issued by the USEPA in 1982 limiting levels of pollutants in 
wastewaters discharged by iron and steel mills, modifications were made to the 
regulation (USEPA 1983a). The NRDC had challenged a ’water bubble' provision 
in the regulation. The amendment agreed upon the NRDC, USEPA and the steel 
industry allowed the trading of pollutants between outfalls of a plant only if 
an overall reduction in pollution levels would be achieved. The required 
reduction is about 10% for conventional water pollutants and about 15% for 
toxic water pollutants.
The Clean Water Act in the United States sets minimum federal 
standards that have to be met by all waste water treatment plants (i.e. a 
mandatory requirement for secondary treatment of sewerage). This requirement 
is a direct regulatory constraint on the total volume of water pollution 
reaching a full market situation for the proposed phosphorus TDP system and it 
is also a constraining factor on the actually introduced system of TDPs for 
BOD water pollution on two rivers in Wisconsin. That is, markets for TDPs in 
the US are only possible in situations there further reductions in water 
pollution, over and above the minimum mandated federal standards, are 
required. Nevertheless this residual is quite substantial in some areas 
otherwise the TDP approach would not have got off the ground.
Not es:
1. TDP is another name for a marketable pollution permit and is generally 
(but not always) used in a water pollution context.
2. Professor E. F. Joeres (1982), Department of Civil and Environmental 
Engineering, University of Wislonsin, 'personal communication'.
USEPA, 47 Fed. Reg 23258. 27 May 1982, (at p. 23273).3.
CHAPTER 7
OVERVIEW OF THE DS EXPERIENCE
It is appropriate at this stage to take stock of the American 
experience for the issues that have to be confronted and to comment on some of 
the insights gained.
7.1 KEY ISSUES IN THE DESIGN OF MARKET * (i)
It is a long way from a general decision on policy strategy in 
favour of marketable pollution permits to the actual design and implementation 
of such systems. Oates (1983) notes a number of major issues have to be 
confronted in the design of a marketable pollution permit system and the 
markets in ttfiich they can be traded:
(i) What should be the life of the permits: finite (how long?) or
inf init e?
(ii) Should the emissions allowed under a given permit vary with the 
seasons and other conditions that influence the assimilative capacity 
of the environment? If so, how?
(iii) Who should be allowed to buy and sell permits: only the sources of 
emissions or others as well (e.g. , environmental groups)?
(iv) How is the market to function? Will there be leasing of permits for 
short periods? Can there be futures and/or options markets? Will 
there be a role for a public agency or can private brokers provide 
the needed services?
(v) Under what rules will exchanges of permits be allowed among sources 
in different locations where the effects of their emissions on air or 
water quality differ?
(vi) Where there are 'large* polluters, will monopolistic (or
monopsonistic) practices impair seriously the functioning of the 
permit market?
(vii) How are the permits to be distributed initially: by auction, by
direct distribution to existing sources without charge, or other 
means? If by direct distribution, the environmental authority must 
specify an initial entitlement for each source.
How are permits to be treated for tax purposes?
Should not 'small1 sources be excluded from control? If so, \4iat is 
the definition of 'small' for each pollutant?
How will plant closures be handled? In particular, will firms that 
shut down be allowed to sell their emissions entitlements?
How should the environmental authority proceed if, at some future 
time, further reductions in pollution levels become necessary?
Will a MPP scheme be equitable?
What is the appropriate market size?
Should only one environment media (e. g. air) be considered in 
isolation from other media (e.g. land or water)?
What basis should be used to determine pollution levels at the 
commencement of a MPP scheme? Why is this important?
How can new MPP markets be initiated rapidly?
How will the new marketable permit systems relate to existing 
standards-based systems? Or, put in another way, what is the most 
desirable course of evolution from a standards-based system to a 
system of marketable pollution permits?
(xviii) What are the appropriate roles for different levels of government in 
this process of regulatory reform?
Comments from the economics literature on some of these issues follow.
7.1.1 Permit Specification
Definition of MPP entitlement - To avoid monitoring and enforcement 
problens and the possibility that a source may discharge levels of pollutants 
over a short time causing a temporary dangerous deterioration in ambient 
environment quality, it is more practical to denominate the MPP entitlement in 
terms of instantaneous rates. The compliance of allowed rates can be checked 
by on-the-spot monitorings of actual rates and comparisons with reported 
rates. Further by specifying allowed rates, MPPs can limit pollution levels 
in any given day or hour.
Duration of MPPS - MPPs can be issued with either an unlimited or 
restricted duration. If the term of MPPs vary, then the needs of varying 
pollution sources could be met and regulatory flexibility retained. For 
example construction companies and firms facing cyclical demands would prefer
(viii)
(ix)
(x)
(xi)
(xii) 
(xiii)
(xiv)
(xv)
(xvi) 
(xvii)
short term MPPs iriiile firms with heavy capital investments or long-term 
production contracts would acquire MPPs that are long-term in nature so as to 
ensure their continued operation. The duration of MPPs and the method of 
their initial allocation have implications for long-term, market entry/exit 
incentives, because for example a free issue of limited duration of MPPs at 
regular intervals will distort business decisions and firms will measure their 
costs against the value of their production plus the market value of the MPP 
and could be tempted to enter or remain in a market to ensure they receive 
regular, free gift of a valuable resource (the MPP). But, on the other hand, 
if the MPPs last forever, firms' decisions to leave are no longer dependent on 
receipt of MPPs and its permanent MPPs can be sold like any other asset.
Homogeneity of MPPs - Government can directly affect the demand for 
MPPs. An important factor is the need to make MPPs homogeneous (except in 
relation to the location and/or effective stack height of pollution releases 
where these matter). Homogeneous MPPs reduce the research and transaction 
costs vdiich must be borne by the purchaser, because the firm would not have to 
evaluate MPPs offered by one source verses those offered by another source. 
If MPPs are not homogeneous, they are different commodities and a number of 
MPP markets will be required (each being smaller and more volatile). Also, to 
make MPPs more homogeneous they should have a long or unlimited duration, and 
in the case of any necessitated reduction in pollution in a region all MPPs 
should be treated equally during a rollback.
-The simplicity of homogeneous MPPs however must be balanced by the 
practical problem that non-equivalent pollutants are lumped together in 
trades. Theiler (1982) notes for example that within the category of volatile 
organic compounds, some compounds are more toxic than others. Another example 
results from the trading of particulate emissions that are not inhalable 
against the fine particulates that do present a health hazard (the larger 
particles are much more amenable to control than fine particulates and 
therefore are an attractive alternative for reduction to offset against the 
difficult-to-control fine particulates).
7.1.2 Allowable Pollution Level Variations
Seasonal Variations — Depending on the characteristics of a 
pollutant and the assimilative capability of the environment, variations in 
MPPs may be possible to meet changing seasonal conditions. Variable MPPs have
so far only been discussed in relation to water pollution. For example 
Wisconsin State, in its scheme of transferable discharge permits, made 
provision for water flow/temperature TDPs so as to cope seasonal variation 
(see Section 6.2).
Emergency Conditions - Variability over time in the assimilative 
capacity of the environment (e.g. streamflow), and quantities and strengths of 
pollution discharges have long posed problems for pollution control 
agencies. In such episodes, additional controls such as maximum instantaneous 
discharge rates or emergency cutback powers are required. These short term 
measures are usually applied uniformally across broad classes of polluters and 
suffer from an inefficiency problem in that they fail to reflect differences 
in the net benefit losses to the various polluters. Howe & Lee (1982) suggest 
a system of priority pollution rights to cope with such episodes. Their 
proposal adapts a long standing system of Western USA water law that gives 
first priority access of water to 'senior' holders of water rights. 
(Australian water law does not have such a provision.) Their priority 
pollution permit feature could be added to MPP schemes. As noted elsewhere, 
the imposition of fixed discharge standards can involve excess costs for the 
regulatory agency and excessive uncertainty for polluters. However these are 
just the problems that their priority pollution rights system would address - 
the efficient allocation of short-term changes in allowable discharges among 
polluters. Those for whom short-term adoption is costly would buy the more 
senior rights. Based on experience with the priority water rights law, they 
suggest that relatively efficient markets for priority pollution rights may be 
established within a State thus increasing adaptability of MPP systems to 
short-term fluctuations, whilst the establishing of markets between states 
could be difficult (this caution can be seen to be relevant in Australia where 
the water quality and quantity of the Murray River has required difficult 
negotiations between NSW, SA, Victoria and Commonwealth Governments). Such a 
modification is wrorth consideration.
A similar concept had been earlier suggested by Tietenberg (1974) 
who proposed that the regulatory agency sell a set of MPPs which take effect 
only in emergency situations. This approach has the advantage of allocating 
very scarce pollution rights to those who need them most, since the ones who 
most value the right to pollute wri.ll be the ones willing to pay the price. 
However in order to ensure MPP markets are not complex, regulatory agencies 
may prefer to impose direct controls in emergency situations.
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7.1.3 Participants in MPP Markets
It has been suggested that the regulatory agency, on behalf of the 
community, should itself trade in the MPP market according to th ether it 
considers the price for MPRs exceeds or in less than the narginal damage cost 
of pollution. Whereas a charges strategy puts all the costs of pollution and 
the uncertainties about future costs on polluters, a strategy of inital free 
allocation of MPPs and the establishment of market in thich polluters and the 
community through the regulatory agency can complete for MPRs will have the 
same efficiency outcome but a more widespread distribution of costs and 
risks. Thus in a situation where monitoring programs indicate the need for a 
reduction in pollution levels, the regulatory agency would purchase MPPs.
Nevertheless it is considered that the regulatory agency may be 
reluctant in being directly invovled in MPP trading. In situations where 
pollution must be reduced the regulatory agency may find this be an extremely 
costly operation, especially in times of public sector expenditure 
constraits. They may also face conflict of interest problems in such 
circumstances. Thus the direct participation of the regulatory agency in the 
market trading of MPRs would be adminsitratively impractical from its own 
viewpoint. Creating the institutional framework is a far more important role 
for a regulatory agency. To stimulate and facilitate MPP Trading, the
regulatory agency can act as unpaid brokers or act as banks by maintaining a 
central registry of certified pollution reduction credits.
Besides governments, and existing and potential pollution sources, 
other participants in a MPP market could include speculators, brokers and
community groups. Speculators should not be discouraged because they can
stablise MPP prices by buying MPPs when prices are low and selling them when 
prices are high. So far in the US experience there has been little, if any, 
speculative activity. On the other hand brokering activity is already 
happening.
Concern has been expressed that environmental groups may enter MPP 
markets, buy up some of the rights to pollute and 'retire them thus
eliminating some pollution. As Oppenheimer & Russell (1982) note, allowing 
environmentalists into MPP markets can be seen as another avenue for the 
expression of community preferences over environmental quality and commodity 
price combinations. However retiring pollution rights would be merely one 
strategy towards achieving the environmental group's goals. They also have 
the option of lobbying the government for a policy of issuing fewer MPPs at 
the beginning, with the effect that the cost is distributed over the thole
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population (rather than to just the environment group members if they 
purchased MPPs themselves). On the other hand, once MPPs have been issued the 
only option remaining for the environment group will be to purchase MPPs. 
However for small sized environmental groups, the strategy may be far too 
costly and if society is near an optimum in terms of environment protection 
marginal benefits and marginal costs, no subgroup of the population would find 
it worthwhile to purchase MPPs. Turning to practical considerations, the 
authors note that funds reported to be available to environmental groups are 
rather minor when compared with the resources of firms and the estimates of 
annual cost, for example, of approaching ambient air quality in the South 
Coast Air Basin of California which is close to US $100 million. In other 
words this concern about the participation of environmental groups in MPP 
markets is unlikely to be an issue.
Although technically and institutionally much more difficult, it is 
desirable that both area and non-stationary sources of emissions be included 
in MPP schemes.
7.1.4 Some Aspects of MPP Trading
Leasing MPPs - The ability to lease MPPs for short periods adds 
flexibility and improves efficiency, for example during temporary equipment 
shutdowns or accidents. So excess pollution abatement equipment is not 
installed as 1 insurance1 with the result that marginal pollution abatement 
costs are lowered.
Futures and/or Option Markets for MPPs - There is always some 
uncertainty in pollution control programs. Firms can reduce the uncertainties 
they face if under MPP system rules there exist futures and options markets. 
A futures market in MPPs would help firms considering expansion because it 
ensures that they can acquire MPPs at a known price in the future. Similarly, 
a MPP options market gives firms the opportunity to acquire options (or not) 
on future MPPs so increasing their ability to deal with an uncertain future. 
Other benefits of futures/options markets in MPPs are that speculators can 
operate which will tend to stabilise MPP prices and tend to reduce the market 
influence away from large polluters who could try to manipulate the market.
Role of Brokers in MPP Trading - Opportunities exist for either the 
private or public sector to undertake a brokering function of finding buyers 
and sellers of MPPs. There may be a conflict of interest if the regulatory 
agency which approves trades ensure compliance with regulations also acts as a 
broker. The experience in the United States has shown that brokers have had a
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useful and viable role. In one offset transaction the brokerage commission 
was 5%. There have been firms, Chambers of Commerce and even the economic 
development agencies of state governments performing the brokerage role. The 
latter may be augmented by creating an office with an information 
clearinghouse role to support and stimulate ERC trade by the provision of 
information on potential market participants, on the latest regulations, on 
technical issues of air quality modelling and emission baseline determination, 
and to possibly seek from the regulatory agency clarifications of trading 
rules. USEPA (1981a) provides a number of papers describing the role and 
activities of brokers.
7.1.5 Types of MPP Trades
The types of trades allowed in MPPs will be determined by the rules 
covering the operation of the market. These rules depend on whether trading 
is in (i) an ambient-based permit system (APS) or (ii) an emission-based 
permit system (EPS), or (iii) a hybrid pollution-offset permit system. 
Trading will either be on a one-for-one basis in the case for (ii) or 
according to the trading co-efficient rate in the case of (i) and (iii) . 
Discussion of this issue is covered in more detail in Section 4.2.3. of this 
paper.
7.1.6 Market Failure
Changes in market prices for MPPs will reflect shifts in MPP supply 
and demand. Expansion of polluting industrial activity will increase the 
demand for MPPs and this will tend to raise MPP prices and increase trading in 
MPPs. Higher prices would lead to increased production of MPPs in the long 
term. On the other hand, a decline in industrial activity will increase the 
supply of MPPs from production curtailments and shutdowns, lowering MPP prices 
and thus increasing the region's long term attractiveness to new industry.
An often expressed concern is that MPP markets will not achieve the 
competitive ideal. The Californian South Coast Air Basin Study (Cass & others 
1982) and the Maryland Study (Maryland Department of Economic and Community 
Development 1982) have addressed this issue in their proposed designs for 
markets in air pollution permits.
Monopolists typically restrict output to raise prices and to earn
higher profits. Society loses because prices do not reflect social
opportunity costs. In the pollution case, assume each firm receives a free
initial allotment of MPPs. A monopolist in a MPP market can sell permits at a
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price higher than if the market was competitive. In general, the monopolist 
will sell too few permits and perform too little abatement activity. 
(Alternatively, a firm may be a monopsonist, buying too few MPPs (and 
therefore undertaking too much abatement activity) because his demand for MPPs 
forces up their price.) Overall, abatement costs exceed the least-cost amount 
because the price of MPPs exceeds the competitive price.
The Californian study into emissions of sulphur oxides approached 
this issue by using simulations on a competitive, minimum-cost allocation of 
permits and then to see if the result shown an especially high degree of 
concentration of holdings. The monopsonist situation is possible because the 
single largest source of emissions of sulphur oxides is an electric utility 
which in 1973 (prior to controls) accounted for approximately 28% of emissions 
in Los Angeles. Their simulations demonstrate that the possibility of serious 
market imperfections does exist. However they find that-monopsony appears to 
be a serious MPP design concern only if the regulations do not conform to the 
existing ambient air quality standards. They note first that market 
imperfections could be important if existing permits were simply made tradable 
unless the initial allocation were designed to guard against it, and second 
that an auction process however would put all pollution sources on the same 
(demand) side of the market and would therefore have less chance of leading to 
monopolistic practices.
Another major potential failure in MPP markets is that transactions 
will be too infrequent to communicate realistic price signals to polluting
firms, to make relatively easy the acquisition of MPPs for entry and expansion 
of polluting facilities, and to allow a firm to avoid substantial transactions 
costs when it desires to make a trade. This problem has been termed market 
thinness. One crude measure is the number of firms accounting for existing 
and expected emissions. Nevertheless the issue is difficult to determine in 
advance of operating the market. A second problem in anticipating the extent 
of market thinness is that there is a tendency to underestimate the 
possibility of transactions. A extra source of demand and supply in MPPs will 
be dynamic factors that are not measurable in advance; such as technological 
process and abatement innovations, exit and entry and change in size of
firms. The Californian study notes that whether the market is thin, initially 
and in the future, depends in part on the design of the MPP system.
The Maryland report in detailing a simulation case study of
emissions of nitrogen oxides in the Baltimore Air Quality Control Region finds
that, in spite of the small number of firms being responsible for most of
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these emissions, the possibility of monopolisation of a MPP market may be 
reduced by the proper initial distribution of permits. The result, which is 
specific to their simulation studies, is to base the initial distribution of 
MPPs on uncontrolled emissions rather than controlled emissions. In the 
Baltimore case the three largest nitrogen oxide emitters account for 82% of 
emissions from major sources. However they find that the initial distribution 
of MPPs is not a good indication of who might have monopoly or monopsony power 
because this does not take into account abatement costs faced by individual 
firms. High abatement cost firms would become net MPP purchasers. To the 
extent that monopolisation possibilities depend on market participation, 
weaker standards which require fewer firms to enter the market to buy MPPs, 
worsen monopoly problems.
7.1.7 Initial Distribution of MPPs
Basically Governments can initially distribute the MPPs by either 
selling them through an auction process or by allocating them at no charge. 
The literature examines the use of 'Dutch' auctions and 'English' auctions 
with the former being favoured because it assures participants of obtaining 
all the MPPs they ordered at the same market price and because it discourages 
strategic bidding behaviour. If a regulatory agency is concerned about the 
political and distributional effects of making pollution sources pay for each 
MPP, they can be given away according to some function of the historical 
pollution load of each source and ideally not penalising sources that have 
already undertaken extensive abatement activity. Further discussion of the 
initial distribution of MPPs occurs at various point in previous Chapters of 
this report. See also Lyon (1982).
7.1.8 Tax Considerations
In the USA, taxation provisions allow accelerated depreciation on 
pollution abatement equipment but only straight-line depreciation of 
intangible asscsts such as patents, licences and permits. In principle, 
taxation treatment for expenditures on pollution abatement and for 
expenditures on acquiring MPPs should be the same otherwise there will be a 
distorting influence making the opportunity costs for each course of action 
unequal.
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7.1.9. What sized Pollution Sources Should be Excluded 
from MPP Markets
The USEPA has defined large emission sources to be those that emit 
over 100 tons of a pollutant per year. But there can be quite a number of 
pollution sources which emit up to 100 tonnes/year that are unregulated, and 
the cumulative impact of these sources can be significant in terms of ambient 
air quality. As noted by the Maryland report (1982), for reasons of improving 
the baseline emission inventory and for widening the number of participants, 
it is suggested that as many medium sized sources be included in the MPP 
scheme. It is recognised that there has to be some lower cut-off point which 
excludes minor sources of emissions (e.g. less than 10 tons/year) otherwise 
the regulatory agency could be faced with disproportionate administrative 
costs from being over-comprehensive.
7.1.10 Plant Closures
So as not to inhibit a market in MPPs, the treatment of pollution 
reductions resulting from plant shutdowns such as a firm closing one process 
in a plant or the whole plant should be carefully considered. As noted in the 
Maryland report (1982), plant shutdowns and process curtailments could be a 
steady and relatively inexpensive supply of MPPs. In an initial phase of a 
MPP market, the supply of shutdown-based MPPs could sustain trading while 
potential market participants become accustomed to the market and develop 
confidence in the system to invest in MPPs through innovative pollution 
control measures. They note that various state jurisdictions have treated 
such emission reductions differently - one state proposes to exclude shutdown 
generated MPPs completely and other states place varying limited durations on 
MPPs resulting from shutdowns. In both situations the supply of MPPs is 
reduced. From the regulatory point of view, shutdown—based MPPs are easy to 
quantify and enforce. For administrative simplicity, shutdown—based MPPs 
should be treated in the same way as any other MPPs.
7.1.11 Procedures for Handling Possible Future Reductions in Pollution Levels 
The experience in the USA has been that ownership of air pollution
entitlements has tended to be vested in existing pollution sources, at least
in a de facto sense. However the permanency of these property rights is not
clear. So long as ambient air quality is judged to be deficient, stricter
standards can be expected which will have the effect of eroding the value of
these de facto rights. It is extremely important that, before a MPP system
commences, the rules under which the system operates be clearly spelt out
beforehand and cover both the duration of the MPPs and the procedures that
- 83 -
will be followed in the event that environment quality levels dictate the need 
for adjustment.
The need for accurately determining pollution source baselines for 
correct certification of MPPs is noted in Section 7.1.15. It is also 
important that baselines be determined for as many pollution sources as 
possible so as to ensure an efficient procedure for reducing pollution levels 
either to meet current ambient standards or meet stricter standards in the 
future because in such 1 rollback1 situations the burden of reducing pollution 
is spread wider (and does not fall on large polluters disproportionately). 
Once the extent of the reduction has been promulgated, pollution sources can 
meet their stricter baselines by either installing additional pollution 
controls or engage in MPP trading, according to their relative costs. Most 
state jurisdictions have followed the USEPA lead by discounting (or devaluing) 
ERCs to meet air quality goals. The Maryland report (1982) suggests that all 
pollution sources should be treated in the same way by a uniform proportionate 
reduction to all pollution source baselines and MPPs. Otherwise, differential 
treatment across MPP categories, or between MPPs and pollution baselines, can 
cause uncertainty which could lead to diminished participation in a MPP 
market.
7.1.12 Equity/Distributional Aspects
The political feasibility of a MPP system will depend partly on its 
perceived fairness and equity. The sti ly by Cass & others (1982) in 
California notes three distributional issues. The first relates to the view 
that MPPs are immoral because they convey a right to pollute (so too do 
discharge permits for that matter). In fact MPPs do not imply a reduction in 
the ability to control pollution, nor negate society's right to regulate- it. 
The design issue is to ensure MPPs are defined carefully enough to avoid 
giving the impression that the public's right to control pollution is 
diminished.
The second equity issue is to examine the effects of a MPP market on 
the industrial structure of a region. The Californian study from its analysis 
finds that a MPP system will have a more even financial impact across firms 
and industries than a direct regulatory, standard—setting approach because 
imposing roughly similar and simultaneous costs on all businesses in a region 
through a MPP system introduction is far less damaging to local industry than 
regulating on a case-by-case basis, with cost increases taking place 
sequentially over a number of years.
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The third equity issue is that the principal effect of relatively 
pure MPP system is that the permits to discharge pollution become a valuable 
intangible asset (property right) to their holders, thereby affecting the 
distribution of wealth in society. In this context the USEPA prefers the term 
1 pollution entitlements' rather than 1 pollution rights'. In this connection, 
the initial allocation of MPPs by auction may be seen as a new 'tax' that may 
negate the abatement cost savings of moving to a MPP system. This is why 
1 grandfather' allocations of permits have political attraction. The 
Californian study suggests use of a hybrid allocation system - zero revenue 
auctions.
A possible distributional issue emering from the US experience with 
USEPA's Emission Trading Policy is the differing effects on inner city and 
suburban populations caused by offset arrangements where 'old' industry areas 
which are usually located in inner city areas increase emissions while 'new' 
industry areas in the suburbs decrease emissions. The result is increased 
pollution impacts on inner city populations which generally are not as 
wealthy.
Although economists are concerned with economic efficiency, 
politicians are also concerned about distributional effects. So the key to 
political acceptance for a system of MPPs is equity because such systems can 
have important distributional effects, not only the pollution abatement costs 
have to be met by firms but also under many MPP scheme formulations firms must 
also pay for each unit of pollution they generate. These costs, both control 
costs and the payments for MPPs, are either absorbed by the consumer through 
higher prices or directly or indirectly by the shareholders of the polluting 
firm. Nevertheless these increased costs may be partly or fully balanced by 
lower control costs resulting from trading in MPPs. Also the option of a 
'grandfather' allocation of MPPs would mean that such transfer payments do not 
become part of a firm's balance sheet. Studies have suggested that these cost 
increases have effects similar to a sales tax (i.e. regressive). On the other 
hand, the potential reduction in control costs brought about by the 
efficiencies of a MPP scheme could be expected to have a similar incidence.
7.1.13 Definition of Market Areas
The definition of the market (or zone) area is dependent on the 
characteristics of the pollutant and the assimilative capacity of the 
environment. For example, some air pollutants only have localised effects 
while others such as carbon dioxide or chlorofluorocarbons are termed global
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pollutants. This issue is addressed in Section 4.2.3 in relation to the 
choice of a MPP system and a brief description of a case study follows.
In an interesting study, Mendelsohn (1982) estimates how many zones 
should be created for MPPs for sulphur dioxide emissions across the US. The 
marginal damage of a unit of emissions is assumed to be roughly proportional 
to the population density of the Census county groups from which it is 
emitted. Markets for MPPs for sulphur dioxide need to be sufficiently large 
to encourage efficient trading and competition. He finds that no more than 
six markets are needed for all USA. He suggests that dense central cities 
should probably each be a single market, or at least be combined with other 
dense central cities. On the other hand, vast areas of rural and suburban 
country can be combined into a single market because the local marginal 
damages per emission do not vary enough to warrant separating the areas.
An additional complication to the definition of market boundaries is 
the long-range transportation of pollutants problem. Atkinson (1982) notes 
that while a MPP strategy for sulphur dioxide (SC^) control can cost- 
effectively meet the local ambient air quality standard, such a strategy can 
result in increased long-range sulphate (SO^) deposition - the 1 acid rain1 
phenomenon. He attempts to measure the extent to which the cost savings of 
implementing a local ambient permit system (APS) is due to externalising the 
costs of long-range sulphate deposition originating from the Cleveland region 
of the Ohio River Basin. This region is likely to be a non-attainment area 
and is believed to contribute significantly to the acid rain problem in north­
eastern USA. The pollution sources examined in the study comprise the 25 
largest point sources of sulphur dioxide which account for 95% of total 
regional emissions from all major point sources and 60% of total regional 
ambient degradation. Elecricity generation plants account for 94% of sulphur 
dioxide emissions and these sources have substantially taller stacks than 
other sources and are thus the greatest potential sources of long-range 
sulphate emissions. Using linear programming techniques, solutions are 
derived for a local (i.e. intra—regional) APS strategy and, after 
incorporating constraints relating to the long-range transport of sulphates, 
an inter—regional APS strategy. In terms of pollution control expenditures, 
the inter—regional solution is more costly than the intra-regional solution 
because some externalities are internalised. The results of this study show 
that the local APS strategy is more cost-effective than the current 1 command 
and control1 regulatory system. However this saving is due to a greater 
loading of the local environment with sulphur dioxide and substantially
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reduced control of emissions from electricity generating plants, both of which 
contribute to long-range sulphate transport. The introduction of additional 
controls due to the acid rain problem substantially reduces the cost—savings 
advantage of the APS strategy over existing regulatory controls. This result 
raises the question whether the remaining differential is substantial enough 
to cover additional transaction and administrative costs of the APS
strategy. A similar conclusion is reached by Atkinson (1983).
An extreme case of the emission-based MPP system (Tietenberg 1980) 
is a scheme in which the entire region, or an entire nation for that matter, 
is a single market. The regulatory agency would issue a set number of MPP's 
for the region as a whole and the subsequent bids and offers of participants 
results in a single market-clearing price. An interesting case is the 
creation of a single national market from the control of
chlorofluorocarbons. The USEPA banned the use of chlorofluorocarbons (CFCs) 
as aerosol propellants in 1978 and in 1980 they announced that a MPP scheme 
was being examined as one possible regulatory option if the control of non­
aerosol uses of CFCs was needed in the future. Unlike the Emissions Trading 
Policy which was overlaid on an existing system of direct controls, however, 
in the case of CFCs the USEPA proposed that the MPP scheme could be used as 
the sole regulatory approach on a nationwide scale, (i.e. a single market). 
Shapiro & Warhit (1983) describe the results of the economic assessment of the 
proposal and the public reaction. CFCs have characteristics which lend 
themselves to the use of economic incentives. First, only aggregate CFC use 
determines the ultimate damage to the stratosphere, so spatial aspects of 
pollution location and dispersion are not important and only a single national 
MPP market is required to efficiently regulate CFC activities. Second, CFCs 
are used in many applications by large numbers of small firms so a specialised 
MPP market would be competitive. A market based approach was found to have a 
40% advantage in terms of actual resource costs of the controls compared with 
introducing a system of mandatory controls. The authors note five conclusions 
in relation to using a MPP approach: (i)
(i) There would be significant transfer payments from final consumers to 
MPP holders (due to higher prices for CFCs) which would be several 
times the magnitude of the actual resource costs of CFC controls.
(ii) There are relatively few options for reducing CFC use in the near 
future, especially in the case of refrigeration where there are no 
viable substitutes.
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(iii) Even where substitutes were available, potential problems existed 
such as the environmental acceptability of substitutes. Thus 
concurrent regulations may be required to ensure the undesirable 
substitutes are not used.
The initial allocation costs among industries using CFCs would be 
different than under a mandatory control scheme.
Given the steep marginal cost curve for controlling CFC's that was 
found, the transfer payments would be very sensitive to small changes 
in the allowed level of CFG generation.
The authors note that the USEPA's assessment of the MPP proposal for 
controlling CFG production highlighted several aspects that need to be 
addressed in the analysis of MPP proposals as a regulatory tool:
(i) The study focussed mainly on the efficiency gains, but public 
reaction emphasised the need to examine transfer payment aspects 
which came to draw most attention.
(ii) Short-run transition effects should not be ignored, particularly due 
to the unique nature of the regulatory transition contemplated.
(iii) The USEPA underestimated the difficulty of introducing and explaining 
the MPP concept to potentially affected parties. The fact that real 
resource costs would be lower under a MPP scheme relative to the 
introduction of mandatory controls was not a sufficient justification 
because moving from a situation of no regulation to one involving 
regulation would have increased costs to most parties (except MPP 
holders). These explanation problems were compounded by the novelty 
of the approach and by the lack of specifics as to how the policy 
would be implemented.
7.1.14 Need for an Integrative Approach
An integrated approach to controlling pollution problems requires 
that each different assimilative medium of the environment should not be 
examined in isolation. Most industry is based on processing materials and any 
reduction of their air pollution for example, usually leads to additional 
water or land pollution. This transfer problem can be mitigated to some 
extent by increased efficiency in materials and energy usage through improved
technology and housekeeping practices, and the reuse or recycling of
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(iv)
(v)
wastes . However there is mostly a transfer of pollution between 
environmental media rather than an absolute reduction in the amount of 
pollution. This realisation from adopting a mass balance approach leads to 
the need for an integrated approach. That is, there should be the use of 
extended bubbles covering all environmental media.-*’ For example, rather than 
allowing 'one dimensional1 bubbles for air pollutants, environment agencies 
should examine the practicality of controlling pollution by the use of 
integrated 'three dimensional' bubbles that control the disposal of wastes 
from industrial plants in all media and in particular a three dimensional 
bubble that stimulates the least costly disposal method whether it be to the 
air or water or land, ultimately through the trading of MPPs.
Recognising that pollution cannot be eliminated but transferred from
one medium to another, the USEPA has established a unit to examine how to
clean up the air, water and land with an integrated environmental management 
2program . The aim is to choose the optimum reduction of pollution across 
media at the lowest cost. This program has started looking at several 
industries, (iron and steel, petroleum refining, pulp and paper and metal 
finishers) and Philadelphia is the first area to be examined. The studies 
will focus on the types of pollution, the pollutant pathways and then the 
impact on people of each pollutant. From this information, health risk 
reductions are estimated for each pollutant at the various levels of control 
costs.
7.1.15 Determination of Pollution Baselines
An important step in establishing a MPP scheme is the determination 
of baseline pollution levels in areas where set ambient standards are violated 
and in areas where ambient standards are not yet exceeded. As noted in the 
Maryland report (1982) a major administrative and technical difficulty is this 
determination. In the case of non-attainment air quality regions the
regulatory agency would document the maximum emission levels over a set period 
of time such as two years (unless this time period can be shown to be 
unrepresentative) as the baseline emission level. The ambient air quality 
baseline level is the legislated level. (In Australia this could be the 
nationally recognised standards such as those recommended by the National 
Health and Medical Research Council for areas which do not have legislated 
ambient standards.)
All pollution sources acquiring MPPs would have pollution baselines 
determined, but for efficiency in the event of possible future pollution level
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reductions it is important that baselines be determined for all sources. 
Determination of baselines in non-attainment regions would take precedence to 
baseline determinations in attainment regions. In attainment regions the 
ambient air quality baseline is determined by monitoring. Pollution source 
baselines are determined either from current permits/licences in the case of 
new sources or from actual emissions levels over a representative period. 
These emission baselines establish levels below which sources can create 
emission reduction credits (i.e. MPPs) which they can trade opportunistically 
now or retain the option for future trading or own use in case of expansion in 
their activity should ambient quality levels dictate a regional pollution 
reduction is necessary and thus start the need for trading.
Establishment of clear baselines is important because this is 
necessary in order to avoid the problem of 1 paper offsets' which is a term 
used to describe a reduction in emissions on paper where no real reduction 
has taken place. Theiler (1982) notes this situation may arise when a 
facility can claim credit for emissions that do not exist. A common example 
is a facility that receives credit in their permit for theoretical emissions 
occurring at a constant rate over a 24-hour period, when in fact a facility 
never operates at that level. In such a situation an offset trade could lead 
to increased pollution rather than decreased pollution.
State regulatory agencies in USA need to establish emission 
inventories of point, areal and mobile sources of air pollution for a number 
of purposes including policy formulation, environment quality reporting and 
atmospheric dispersion model validation. Such inventories are also necessary 
in Australia to enable efficient and effective regulation. An emission 
inventory is also necessary for assisting analysis of proposed trades in MPPs 
to ensure that set air quality standards are not violated by trades. They 
would also serve as a data base from which a broker can commence arranging 
trades in MPPs.
7.1.16 Initiation of New Markets
To obtain the lowest pollution abatement costs in its jurisdiction 
it is incumbent on government to encourage a vital and viable market otherwise 
the region will not experience all the potential benefits from implementing a 
MPP scheme. The Maryland report (1982) makes several suggestions to assist 
the successful initiation of a market. Apart from promulgating policies which 
will favour trading, the government can assemble an initial supply of MPPs by 
reducing emissions from government owned emissions sources with low control
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costs to create MPPs for sale at the marginal cost of abatement from each 
source. If the government owns significant pollution sources (such as power 
plants, large incinerators, large painting or cleaning facilities or 
undertakes engineering or public works itself) which are in polluted areas, 
this approach would ensure some sales take place early in the development of 
the market. Such sales would increase state revenue. Government could also 
ensure at the outset of trading that firms with little reason to hold MPPs, 
such as from plant shutdowns since baseline emissions determination date, 
offer these for sale on the market (see also Section 7.1.10).
Another factor important in initiating a MPP market is to allow 
access to the widest range of participants (see Section 7.1.3). Similarly the 
market should not be restricted to just large pollution sources (see Section 
7.1.9).
As noted elsewhere in this paper, the successful initiation of 
trading in MPPs requires the government to convince potential participants in 
the market that (a) the MPP scheme's benefits will be real, (b) there will be 
no expropriation of MPPs, and (c) that each pollution source will be treated 
in the same manner in the event that the actual ambient environment quality 
requires a reduction in aggregate emissions.
7.1.17 Relationship of MPP Provisions to Existing Standards-Based 
Regulatory Controls
This issue is addressed in Section 7.2.
7.1.18 Roles of Different Levels of Government
This issue is addressed in Section 7.2.
7.2 INSIGHTS FROM THE US EXPERIENCE
The cost and cumbersome nature of the existing US regulatory system 
has come to jeopardise the attainment of environment goals and the wider 
adoption of marketable pollution permits may reduce such pressures. Oates 
(1983) notes that the US experience suggests some insights into the design and 
introduction of economic incentives for pollution control:
In the design of these regulatory systems there are advantages for 
the alternative of marketable pollution permits over pollution 
charges in terms of both pollution abatement cost savings and 
administrative feasibility.
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(i)
(ii)
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(iv)
(v)
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There are no insurmountable practical or theoretical obstacles to the 
design of marketable pollution permit systems.
Although their origins and implementation have been quite different, 
both the USEPA Emissions Trading system and the Wisconsin 
transferable discharge permit system have arrived at essentially the 
same form of permit market - a system of 1 pollution offsets' which 
resolves the spatial problem in a straightforward way by simply 
requiring one source to acquire sufficient permits to maintain 
compliance with standards, in a way that is administratively more 
practicable than imposing on each pollution source a different 
charge.
In addition where adequate models exist the system (as in the 
Wisconsin case) can vary over time the allowable emissions per permit 
according to the assimilative capacity of the environment (e.g. to 
take account of seasonal variations).
On the one hand the USEPA Emission Trading Policy was formulated at a 
very centralised level while the Wisconsin System has as its source a 
much more decentralised planning, consultative and implementation 
effort. In other words such programs could come into being under a 
variety of institutional structures.
There have been some start-up problems in terms of getting the market 
going, probably as a result of novelty of these schemes and of the 
uncertainty of their evolution.
Both types of systems are erected on top of an existing regulatory 
command and control structure and only modifications were entailed.
The perspective that emerges from a consideration of the US experience is 
that MPPs can have a fairly broad potential application. The design of 
effective MPP systems must address the characteristics of particular 
pollutants in specific airsheds or rivers. Thus there needs to be a local MPP 
design and implementation process. However the general guidelines for the 
design of MPP systems can come from either the national government or 
individual agencies whose concern is the environment quality of a specific 
region.
It is possible to be over-enthusiastic about the advantages of MPP 
policies. However as noted by Russell (1981) pollution has characteristics 
that make it impossible to develop complete and reasonably self-regulating 
markets and the design of specialised markets is necessary while still
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retaining some control powers of the regulatory agency. MPP trading 
provisions cannot banish past, present or future political decisions. Nor can 
pollution control agencies relax their monitoring and enforcement roles. 
There are also some practical considerations about the depth of the resultant 
MPP markets including the market behaviour of firms (e.g. possible 
monopolistic buyers or sellers of MPPs or exclusion of potential new entrants) 
and whether there will be enough incentives or changes over time to free up 
MPPs or increase demand for them. Some doubts about MPP systems cannot be 
answered until it has actually been tried. Russell suggests that initial 
experience in the US has shown the potential that such policies can have.
In his review, Brady (1983) makes the following comments about 
the USEPA Emission Trading Policy:
(i) they provide an administrative framework by which firms can offer 
alternative discharge limitations
(ii) although improving the incentive to control pollution, they do not 
change the nature of the air pollution problem
(iii) they have the same technical requirements (i.e. air quality 
modelling, emission licensing, monitoring and enforcement) as the 
current command-and-control air quality management system and to the 
extent there are technical deficiencies in these program elements, 
they will also cause problems in the implementation of an emissions 
trading system.
Brady concludes that the USEPA Emission Trading Policy is a movement in 
the direction of a full MPP system but that its effectiveness in attaining 
ambient air quality goals will be limited by the deficiencies in our 
understanding of air pollution and the technical deficiencies in the existing 
command—and—control regulatory framework in which the Emission Trading Policy 
are embedded.
Experience with the bubble and offset procedures has varied. Most 
of the bubble applications approved by USEPA were changes in control measures 
for total suspended particulates and process changes that affected volatile 
organic compounds (the hydrocarbons that react with nitrogen dioxide in the 
atmopshere to form ozone). Many of the early offset transactions involved 
intrafirm transactions or alterations in state or local government production 
activities. For example, both the Volkswagen plant siting in Pennsylvania and 
the Hampton Roads Refinery siting involved offsets obtained from public sector
through changing from conventional asphelt to water-based asphelt (Foskett 
1980). Many other offset transactions involved internal changes to an 
existing activity in order to expand or build a new activity (USEPA 1981i). 
In some areas, Emissions Trading has made headway (see Section 5.5). A report 
by the US General Accounting Office (USGAO 1982) has surveyed this 
experience. This study found a number of obstacles to getting Emissions 
Trading started. In particular they found that existing uncertainty 
concerning regulatory procedures (and the possibility of more strict control 
requirements in the future) appears to have led existing sources of air 
pollution to hoard emission reduction credits so that frequent trading has not 
occurred. The novelty of the regulatory innovations seems to have made 
potential participants cautious in engaging in transactions. The USGAO 
concludes that the obstacles to the full scale market in air-pollution 
entitlements do not seem unresolvable.
7.2.1 Requirements for Effective Specialised Markets
A central theme of the economics literature is that markets are 
efficient resource allocation institutions, provided they are competitive. 
But in some cases, convergence to the competitive equilibrium cannot be 
assumed. For example the rules of exchange (i.e. the market institution) can 
have a significant effect on the performance of the market. From a review of 
the literature relating to experiments in market design, Hahn (1982) notes 
that social science experiments have supported the belief that market 
mechanisms can be used to control externalities and specifically they 
demonstrate that (a) subjects will internalise external costs when given 
appropriate incentives and (b) the derived demands such as for MPPs do not 
pose any special problems for achieving competitive equilibrium. As various 
institutional designs may be considered in designing a MPP market, it is 
necessary to identify which market institutions perform poorly in the face of 
problems of market thinness (i.e. few buyers or sellers) or of market 
concentration (i.e. monopolist or monopsonist power). He reports two 
essential points arising from economic experiments about market power. 
Firstly, there are situations (such as the case of one seller and five buyers) 
where the market does not necessarily reach competitive equilibrium. 
Secondly, the selection of market institutions may be critical in determining 
the type of equilibrium reached. In specifying the design of a market 
institution, he notes that three basic objectives need to be considered :
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(i) establish a price signal
(ii) approximate the least-cost solution over time
(iii) allow for equity considerations.
He then reports on the results of an experiment to test the 
efficiency of using either grandfathering or the proposed zero revenue auction 
for allocating MPPs and concludes that the results provide preliminary support 
for the view that there are several applications in which static efficiency 
gains from a MPP scheme could be obtained by introducing the zero revenue 
auction market institution which has efficiency advantages over 
grandfathering. This result is illustrative of the need for much further 
theoretical and applied research into the actual design of market mechanisms.
Simulation studies (e.g. Eheart & others 1982) have shown that the 
market clearing price for MPPs - even for the same environment quality 
standard - could vary substantially from one region to another. Whether this 
type of variation would be controversial depends in part on the degree to 
which pollution sources and others recognise the appropriateness of regional 
approaches to environmental management. Such prices also depend on the 
assimilative capacity of the environment and magnitude of pollution to be 
controlled.
In its examination of actual offset transactions in California, the 
US General Accounting Office (1982) found that the prices paid had only 
covered the cost of installing the pollution abatement equipment necessary for 
achieving the required offsetting pollution reduction, although it could be 
expected that the seller would ask for a higher minimum price. The lack of a 
profit premium in the price of the offset probably reflected the novelty of 
and uncertainty about the new USEPA Emission Trading Policy.
Tietenberg (1980,p.393) points out that the key difference between a 
MPP system with full transferability and the USEPA's innovative Emissions 
Trading Policy is that in the former the regulatory agency allows all sources 
to participate in trades and allows all emission reductions to be traded in a 
market. In contrast the bubble and offset policies have restrictions on what 
emission reductions can be traded (e.g. only those additional reductions above 
the standadrd i.e. the ERG) and on what sources can participate in trades. He 
nevertheless recognises that the bubble and offset policies represent 
substantial moves in the direction of an unrestricted market. He noted 
however, that the implementation of a fully unrestricted market for MPPs faces 
a number of legal, technical and administrative issues which he discusses.
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When assessing the USEPA's Emission Trading Policy, Oates (1983) 
notes that the various components of the program need to be recognised as 
approximating a conventional market. The trades allowed under the bubble and 
offset provisions and the storing of emission reduction credits all represent 
standard forms of economic behaviour in the market place. Seen from this 
perspective, the Emissions Trading Policy can become the legal framework for 
establishing a market in marketable air-pollution permits. The Emissions 
Trading Policy bears a close resemblance to the pollution offset scheme 
suggested by Krupnick & others (1983). So does the Wisconsin TDP scheme for 
controlling BOD water pollution. However these new policies are embedded in a 
broader body of direct command-and—control regulations which places obstacles 
(including the need to meet specified technological abatement requirements) in 
the way of reaching the least-cost solution.
Notes:
1. Dr M.G. Morgan (1983), Head, Department of Engineering and Public Policy, 
Carnegie-Malton University, Pittsburgh USA, 1 personal communications'.
2. Mosher, L, (1983), National Journal, 12 February 1983, pp. 322-324.
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CHAPTER 8
POTENTIAL APPLICABILITY OF MARKETABLE POLLUTION 
PERMIT SYSTEMS IN AUSTRALIA
A principal purpose of this study is to examine the potential of 
marketable pollution permit systems for controlling air and water pollution in 
Australia. Whether such systems are introduced in Australia will depend on 
whether there exist situations where controlling pollution remains a problem 
for a number of pollution sources or where the cost of controlling pollution 
continues to be regarded as excessive (in other words if there is sufficient 
pressure for innovative regulatory reforms). Such areas in Australia could be 
expected to be in capital cities and in industrial cities for both air and 
water pollution, and on pollution/drought stressed inland rivers in relation 
to water pollution. An ideal case study of a MPP market would be of a number 
of homogeneous polluting plants in a homogeneous environmental area. For 
example, the situation at Griffith NSW where sixteen wineries discharge waste 
waters with a high BOD content might have been a potential case study, but for 
technical reasons was not suitable because the area's topography prevents 
these discharges from polluting irrigation water supplies obtained from the 
Murrumbidge River and the fact that many wineries are now connecting to the 
district's sewerage system. However a realistic case study must be of at 
least six* independent firms in a self-contained polluted area which were 
emitting the same type of pollution. Current studies of the Newcastle airshed 
by the State Pollution Control Commission the CSIRO Division of Water and Land 
Resources (Dr J. Raima) and the ANU Centre for Resource and Environmental 
Studies would be compiling a data set that could provide the basis for such a 
case study in relation to sulphur dioxide, nitrogen oxides and dust pollution.
8.1 LEGAL/CONSTITUTIONAL ASPECTS
The 1901 Australian Constitution explicitly gave the Commonwealth 
Government 39 areas of responsibility (or 'powers'), and leaves the remaining 
powers to the State Governments, including the control of land-use. The 
Constitution does not refer to environment or conservation, so the 
Commonwealth Government involvement in the environment protection field must 
derive from other powers which the Constitution grants the Commonwealth. 
Despite the potentially limiting effect of the Constitution, the Commonwealth
Government has identified a number of national advantages in, and avenues for, 
increasing Commonwealth involvement in environment protection.
The first avenue by which Commonwealth Government can enter the 
environmental field is by exercising one of the following powers outlined in 
the Constitution: taxation, trade, the Territories, coastal waters, the 
continental shelf, external affairs, defence and where the Commonealth owns 
properties. In addition the Commonwealth has used specific purpose grants and 
its control over export permits to achieve environmental objectives. This 
latter power was confirmed by the High Court of Australia in a 1975 decision^ 
which allowed the Commonwealth under the categorisation test to exercise a 
constitutional power to achieve environmental objectives. In 1976 the High 
Court^ ruled that the Commonwealth Government's jurisdiction in relation to 
the marine environment commenced at the low tide mark. More significantly in 
1983 the High Court confirmed and clarified that the Commonwealth Government 
could validly enact legislation in respect of its external affairs, race, and 
trading corporations powers when it examined the legal basis of the 
Commonwealth Government's decision to ban construction of a dam in a declared 
World Heritage Area in the south-west of Tasmania.
Other avenues for Commonwealth Government involvement reflect the 
need either for a co-ordinated approach to environmental problems or for 
activities that may be beyond the resources or political inclination of 
individual State Governments. Thus the Commonwealth can become involved for 
example in dealing with inter-state flows of pollutants such as Murray River 
salinity or long-lived air pollutants which may require a co-ordinated 
approach by several governments. Similarly the undertaking of research on 
environmental problems is an example of Commonwealth involvement in the latter 
situation. In addition the Commonwealth Government has also utilised 
Commonwealth-State collaborative bodies to achieve a co-operative approach to 
environment protection issues. Also, both Parliamentary Committees and the 
Commonwealth Government have initiated inquiries into national issues. 
]?Ifl02.1y there are a number of Commonwealth Government activities which support 
its long-term role in environmental planning. For example it can create 
specialist organisations, fund research, undertake systems analysis studies, 
provide technical advice, and establish environmental data bases.
The implications of the above discussion, as has been suggested by 
some commentators4, is that the Commonwealth Government could become involved 
to a much greater extent in environment protection in Australia. It may be 
possible that the Commonwealth could establish national pollution standards
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and even the regulatory system used to control pollution. However this course 
of action could be expected to cause considerable political disruption and 
community divisiveness. In terms of environment protection through the use of 
marketable pollution permits, the Commonwealth might be able to establish MPP 
markets in relation to controlling so-called 'transborder1 or 1 global 
pollutants' such as sulphur oxides, carbon dioxide or chlorofluorocarbons. In 
the immediate future however it is expected that pollution control will remain 
largely a responsibility of State Governments in Australia, especially as 
their pollution control regulatory structure is in place. So for the time 
being the decision whether to introduce marketable pollution permit schemes 
will remain with State Governments, particularly as the introduction of MPP 
systems can entail only the modification of existing standards-based direct 
regulatory systems rather than their complete elimination.
8.2 EXISTING REGULATORY APPROACHES IN AUSTRALIA
As a general comment, the NSW system of pollution controls is based 
on the approach that was developed in the United Kingdom while the Victorian 
system is modelled more on the approach adopted in the United States of 
America. The other States have followed the UK approach.
8.2.1 Victoria
Before 1970 air pollution in Victoria was controlled under the Clean 
Air Act 1958 and its 1965 Regulations. The general philosophy was one of best 
practicable means. With the introduction of the Environment Protection Act 
1970 the Environment Protection Authority was established and there was a 
change in approach to utilise a licensing system and an eventual regional air 
quality management regime. Initially the licensing system has operated in 
effect as a best practicable means approach. Finally the State Environment 
Protection Policy for the Air Environment of Victoria was adopted by the State 
Government in 1981.
The Environment Protection Authority of Victoria is currently 
examining reforms to their Environment Protection Act 1970 that will enable 
more cost-effective and efficient pollution control in Victoria . One of the 
reasons for this review was that a court case in 1977 (Protean (Holdings) Pty 
Ltd v. EPA) decided that the EPA under the legislation could only licence 
discharge points and could not impose conditions that sought to control 
pollution at the boundary of a premises emitting pollution (i.e. excluded the 
ability to require 'good management techniques' which would, for example,
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control fugitive emissions). One amendment being considered is the inclusion 
of a new provision to give them the ability to licence premises instead of 
discharge points to overcome the above problem (and incidentally this would 
enable premises to adopt more cost-effective and flexible means of controlling 
their discharges). The EPA considers that except for lead, there are no 'non­
attainment areas' in Victoria and that the environment has sufficient 
assimilative capacity for air pollution except for photochemical smog 
precursors. The Air Quality Policy divides Victoria into three ambient air 
quality regions. Schedule F to the policy sets minimum control requirements 
for a number of stationary sources of pollution (i.e. tends to specify the 
technology required to be used). Schedule G sets emission standards for 
existing stationary air pollution sources while Schedule H sets emission 
limits for new sources (which are closely based on the 1979 recommendations by 
the National Health and Medical Research Council in Australia). Currently 
there are about 4000 air pollution licences, of which 1600 are complex. 
Maximum licence fee that can be levied is $16000. The review of the 
legislation is examining the option of excluding the licensing of minor air 
(and water) pollution sources.
Under the Environment Protection Act 1970, the Environment 
Protection Authority of Victoria also administers a licensing scheme to 
control water pollution. The licence fees are set in a manner that reflects 
to some extent the strength and quantity of the polluting discharges (the 
closest we get in Australia to a pollution charge). Similarly discharges to 
sewers have to pay sewerage rates that partly reflect the cost of treatment. 
State Environment Protection Policies are being progressively developed for 
various regions in Victoria. The EPA has issued about 1850 water pollution 
licences of which about 1000 are complex. Water pollution licence conditions 
are not technology specific. Licence fees could be regarded as a user charge, 
but in practice the EPA recovers less than 30% of its administrative costs 
(including research, monitoring and policy formulation)^. In a High Court of 
Australia case in 1977 (Phosphate Co-Op Co Ltd v. EPA) the Court ruled that 
the EPA could not take account of economic aspects in their licencing 
process. However economic factors are addressed during the formulation of 
State Environment Protection Policies.
8.2.2 New South Wales
In NSW the Clean Air Act, 1961, and subsequent regulations, which 
specify particular standards, provide for the control of air pollution from
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any premises. Administered by the State Pollution Control Commission, the Act 
prescribes that certain work may not be carried out without approval, that the 
occupiers of premises may be required to carry out work as directed, that 
emission standards for air impurities may be prescribed, and that where such 
standards are not prescribed the best practicable means shall be used to 
minimise or prevent air pollution. Special licensing provisions apply to 
certain categories of premises and operations scheduled under the Act. 
Petrochemical plants, for example, are scheduled because pollution can be 
difficult to control for reasons of technology, age or size, and as such are 
required to be licensed. In practice, their power to approve the actual type 
of pollution control equipment selected to be installed has been a major means 
of controlling emissions from new plants.
The initial strategy for controlling air pollution in NSW was to 
adopt best practical means approach which requires that pollution be 
controlled to a level which is technologically practicable and economicly 
feasible. This approach has the advantage that it can be applied without 
depending on extensive monitoring programs. However it does not establish 
standards of air quality. An alternative approach requires that ambient air 
quality standards be set and used to determine the extent of control needed. 
The disadvantage is that, knowledge on the effects of air pollution is 
incomplete and this introduces difficulties and delays in deciding what are 
desirable and practicable standards.
The State Pollution Control Commission is now applying a strategy 
that combines the concepts of ambient air quality management (modified to the 
extent that the desired air quality is expressed in the form of criteria or 
objectives, rather than legal standards) with their traditional approach. Air 
quality data gathered from monitoring programs is being used to indicate when 
new emission, design or product standards need to be prescribed, or existing 
ones need to be made more stringent. All the elements of their control 
strategy work towards the desired air quality, which is one in which no 
adverse health or other effects occur, as defined in the long-term goals of 
the World Health Organisation.
The NSW Clean Waters Act, 1970, and subsequent regulations, which 
prescribe materials declared to be pollutants, have provided the machinery for 
controlling water pollution. Under the provisions of the Act all discharges 
to waterways, be they to land irrigation systems, creeks, estuaries or the 
ocean. Approval must also be obtained for the installation, construction or 
modification of any apparatus, equipment or works for the discharge of
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pollutants. In the first stages of implementing the Act principal emphasis 
was placed on dry-weather flows from point sources with a concentrated effort 
being made to direct wastewaters to sewers. Since the mid 1970s the State 
Pollution Control Commission has devoted more attention to the containment, 
treatment and controlled discharge of contaminated or potentially contaminated 
stormwaters.
The State Pollution Control Commission^ is currently examining the 
possible use of pollution charges as an economic incentive approach for more 
effective pollution control, although such a scheme would be unlikely to 
replace completely their existing discharge standards—based regulatory system 
because this would remain the backstop safety-net. The Sydney region, the 
Newcastle region, the Port Kembla region and the rest of NSW are seen as the 
four possible air quality zones. It is suggested that a marketable pollution 
permit approach could also be considered at the same time.
As the State Pollution Control Commission has been regulating air 
pollution since 1965 there are not many 1 old and polluting' plants remaining 
that have not had some pollution abatement controls applied in that period. 
Their regulatory system is considered to be more flexible than that in the 
USA. In addition they have some additional powers that the USEPA does not 
possess, such as the requirement that proposed new equipment in plants must be 
approved by the Commission before it can be installed.
8.2.3 Other States
In the State of Queensland no changes have been mooted to their 
existing standards-based pollution regulation system and no specific proposals 
have emerged for reforms. Meanwhile in the State of Western Australia a 
review of the institutional arrangements (and their effectiveness) for their 
standards-based pollution control system and environmental impact assessment 
procedures is underway and some consideration is being given to a greater role 
for economic analysis in environmental decision makingSo now could be an 
opportune time for Western Australia's environment agency to examine the 
marketable pollution permit concept. In Tasmania, South Australia and the 
Northern Territory there are no major moves to reform pollution control 
legislation which has been based on a standards-based approach. In the 
Australian Capital Territory, standards-based pollution control ordinances are 
in the process of enactment.
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8.3 USE OF THE BUBBLE AND OFFSETS CONCEPTS IN AUSTRALIA
Victoria was the first, and so far only, State in Australia to 
create ambient air quality control regions (EPA, 1981b, Clause 6) under the 
State Environment Protection Policy, for the air environment pursuant to the 
Environment Protection Act 1970. In addition Victoria is the only State to 
include in their legislation a provision allowing offset arrangements in 
relation to large new sources (EPA, 1981b, Clause 28) which reads:
Emissions from new sources in Air Quality Control Regions shall not exceed
the emission limits prescribed .... In addition, a large new source may
be required to employ best available control technology or, in some cases 
may be licensed only where reductions in emissions from other sources in 
the same region offset the effects of the proposed emissions from the new 
source.
Possible areas where offsets might be applicable are Geelong, 
Mentone, Bayside and Dandenong, Latrobe Valley, Altona and Port Phillip. This 
Clause established one of the elements of a marketable pollution permits 
system. In a related development the EPA is discussing with the can coating 
industry the possibilities of internal offsets (i.e. a bubble in USEPA 
terminology) and may examine similar approaches with other industries in 
Victoria such as printing, car manufacture, petrochemical and oil refining 
companies.It is thought that a bubble approach would be inappropriate for 
water pollution control because usually there is only one point of discharge 
into waterways from a plant^, although offsets between plants may be possible 
where there are sufficient number of dischargers on a waterway.
Australia's largest company, The Broken Hill Proprietary Co. Ltd., 
has noted the potential advantages of MPP systems of regulatory controls and 
sought information on USEPA's Emission Trading Policy from US authorities.
Recently the State Pollution Control Commission has on several 
occasions examined a bubble type approach when proposed new additions to plant 
were submitted for Commission approval.^ For example proposed plant 
additions at two oil refineries and one petrochemical complex in Sydney have 
been examined in this manner. The approach being negotiated was to give the 
plants overall limits on their emissions so as to allow them some flexibility 
in the choice of the combination of pollution abatement controls that would be 
applied. Officers of the Commission suggested that areas of concentrated 
industrial activity could be Port Kembla and Newcastle/Hunter Valley as well 
as the Silverwater and Botany Bay areas in Sydney which may have potential for
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bubble or offsets arrangements.
It is hoped that the NSW State Pollution Control Commission in 
respect of their power to approve new equipment, will continue to adopt this 
flexible approach by examining the emissions of each premises as a whole 
rather than piecemeal. Such a bubble approach will allow firms to select the 
least costly combination of control measures. The actions taken by the State 
Pollution Control Commission is an encouraging sign for achieving improved 
efficiency in environmental regulation. The Commission also should start to 
look at using the offsets concept as has the Environment Protection Authority 
of Victoria.
The Australian Conservation Foundation is Australia's national 
environmental lobby group. The Foundation is not ideologically opposed to the 
marketable pollution permit concept provided that ambient environmental 
quality did not deteriorate as a result of the introduction of such a 
regulatory innovation.^ They are aware of the USEPA Emission Trading Policy 
and have suggested the use of the bubble concept in relation to a proposed 
petrochemical chemical plant expansion in Sydney.
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8.4 POSSIBLE AUSTRALIAN APPLICATIONS
Except in some firms in some years, generally pollution abatement 
capital costs have not been high (see AEG 1983a,b,c). But energy and labour 
costs in some cases remain high. So there is potential for introducing MPP 
schemes, or components thereof, in Australia. To take advantage of MPP 
schemes, pollution sources in both the public or private sectors need 
technical skills, management ability and flexibility in operation. Good 
housekeeping practices would also be needed. It is expected that the first 
pollution sources to avail themselves to opportunities in MPP markets would be 
private sector firms with the most to gain from trading, ie. innovative firms 
would be pathfinders in experimenting with MPP markets. Such firms would need 
to have a 1 profit pillow1 which allows the 'risky1 investment in pollution 
control equipment. Should ambient environmental quality dictate a reduction 
in pollution levels or if profits are depressed, then the pollution abatement 
cost pressures would be even more strongly felt, boosting participation in MPP 
schemes.
Foreign ownership in the mineral processing industry is 
substantial. In the petrochemical industry each firm is at least 50% foreign 
owned. In both industries a number of these parent organisations are based in 
USA. This factor could enable rapid diffusion of experience with the USEPA 
Emissions Trading Policy and generally with the latest pollution abatement 
equipment and process innovations. Another factor is the research ability of 
organisations which would enable them to have the capability of responding to 
such regulatory reforms.
For a competitive MPP market there must be a sufficient density of 
pollution sources. On the basis of economic experiments of market power I 
suggest that a minimum MPP 'market catchment1 contain six independent sources 
discharging the same type of pollutant. Thus MPP markets would most likely be 
established for regions about capital cities or industrial cities.
The exact region of a MPP market would depend on the type of 
pollutant. For sulphur dioxide, for example, it is suggested that New South 
Wales be divided into four regions - Sydney, Wollongong, Newcastle (including 
Hunter Valley) and the rest of NSW. Similarly, in the case of Victoria there 
could be three regions as per their State Environment Protection Policy for 
the air environment - Melbourne, LaTrobe Valley and the rest of Victoria.
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These suggested regions for competitive MPP markets must be qualified if the 
areas are so called 'company towns'. A similar break-up is possible in the 
other States where sufficient industry density exists, otherwise each State 
could be a single region. With air pollutants that have strong local effects, 
however, market regions would be smaller. In terms of water pollutants, a 
whole river or even segments of that river could become a market. For 
transfrontier or global atmospheric air pollutants such as chlorofluorocarbons 
(CFCs), they could theoretically be controlled in a single national market 
administered by the Commonwealth Government. However, this suggestion in 
relation to CFCs would not be politically acceptable, nor would it be 
practical because there are only two firms producing CFCs in Australia, both 
located in the city of Sydney (with minor levels of imports)**% Other 
transborder pollutants are already regulated by State governments and in the 
case of carbon dioxide the significance of this issue is not yet resolved.
In comparison to establishing full MPP markets in Australia, there 
would be wider scope for adapting existing standards-based regulations by the 
addition of the bubble and offset concepts which are 1 stepping stones' to 
establishing a MPP scheme but which are worthwhile introducing in their own 
right - a reform process which has evidently started happening. A bubble 
approach can be applied for one firm while a minimum of two firms are 
necessary for beneficially implementing offset arrangements in both air and 
water pollution fields. Although a barter situation without a market, there 
is potential for controlling pollution at lower aggregate cost.
If a pure ambient permit system (APS) was chosen, there would be 
more potential participants in the MPP market at each receptor point than with 
a pure emission permit system (EPS) with its set of market zones. However, it 
is considered that the hybrid pollution offsets system (POS) is the more 
practical approach.
The two States where markets for MPPs could most likely be 
introduced are New South Wales and Victoria because they are the most populous 
and industrialised. In this respect it is also noted that in both cases their 
regulatory policies are currently under review with a view to improving their 
cost-effectiveness.
In industry, managers responsible for the profit centres of 
polluting firms need to be informed of the economic incentives that exist in 
environmental regulations (such as the bubble or offset concepts) because such
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firms' pollution control managers are usually located in cost centres of firms 
and certainty of outcome (i.e. no environmental violations) is major criteria 
for their activities. Such a realisation led to substantial cost savings 
being realised by the 3M Company world—wide, including in Australia, under 
their 1 Pollution Prevention Pays' program. In the US, the 3M Company has also 
taken advantage of the USEPA Emission Trading Policy's provisions. The key 
point is that MPP systems enable firms to use their commercial skills just as 
in other areas of their operation. This point also illustrates the need for a 
comprehensive educative process to explain such regulatory innovations.
To establish any rational pollution control schemes, including a MPP 
scheme, regulatory agencies need to know ambient environment quality standards 
and the actual types and levels of pollution generated. In addition it is 
necessary to have verified air and water quality models. In relation to MPP 
scheme design, information on the technical aspects of the operation of MPP 
markets is desirable to ensure the viability and competitiveness of MPP 
markets. Data on pollution abatement costs is not essential but is useful for 
simulation studies of various MPP market designs. An accurate MPP record­
keeping system would be required to enable effective monitoring and 
enforcement once a MPP scheme commences. Pollution sources would generally 
have access to the financial and technological information on which they would 
base their commercial judgements.
The following are some suggestions to boost early trading in MPPs.
It is important to encourage as many buyers and sellers of MPPs as 
possible to enter the specialised market to ensure it is viably established. 
Encouragement can be given by both the private sector organisations (such as 
brokers, industry associations and development oriented bodies) and the public 
sector (such as economic development agencies or even regulatory agencies), 
and by academic and community groups.
The minimum quantity of MPPs that can be traded should be set at a 
quite low level so as to increase the potential range of market 
participants. Administrative practicalities of the regulatory agency would
determine this minimum cut-off point.
To boost early trading the public sector has an important role to 
play as some of its own activities cause pollution (e.g., some public works 
activities, sewage treatment or power generation). These activities would 
receive MPPs during the initial allocation, just as did pollution generating
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firms, when a MPP scheme starts. Some of these activities could be cleaned- 
up, or process changes made, which releases MPPs that can be sold in a MPP 
market at a price that covers the marginal cost of clean-up so getting some 
MPPs at an early time and at a basic price level. Doing this would indicate 
the government's determination to get a MPP market successfully functioning as 
well as reducing some uncertainties about the supply of MPPs.
Firms that close down should not have their MPPs confiscated. Such 
closures usually occur for purely commercial reasons and can be a ready source 
of MPPs for the market. Another source of certain types of MPPs would be to 
encourage a change in the fuel type used (e.g. switch to natural gas).
If a MPP scheme was introduced in Australia, it is suggested that it* 
be directed at managing major pollutants (e.g., air pollutants such as sulphur 
oxides, nitrogen oxides, particulates, hydrocarbons, lead or water pollutants 
such as BOD). It should not be applied to hazardous substances where direct 
regulations would provide a more certain basis for ensuring strict controls. 
A key aspect in designing a successful MPP scheme will be simplicity.
Precedents exist for co-operative management of water quality. One 
example is the Commonwealth Government and three State Governments 
establishing the River Murray Commission which deals with water quantity and 
quality issues. Another example is the river quality associations in West 
Germany. It is possible that such co-operative bodies could administer MPP 
schemes for segments of rivers, including determining the allocation of MPPs 
among pollution sources and the rules under which trades could take place.
It is suggested that the concept of a non-attainment area for one or 
more ambient environment standards be adopted in Australia in relation to the 
possible implementation of MPP schemes. It is when an area becomes non- 
attainment that increases in pollution generating economic activities must 
only be accommodated by trading in MPPs so as to ensure that compensating 
reductions in pollution generation happen. The introduction of the non­
attainment area concept does not rule out the possibility of voluntary trading 
in MPPs in attainment areas to take advantage of efficiency gains due to 
bubble or offsets arrangements.
It would be politically desirable at the same time as greater 
economic efficiency is achieved through the introduction of MPP schemes, that 
such MPP trades also result in some reduction in the aggregate levels of 
pollution generated, at least in non-attainment areas. The experience in the
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US has found this result to be happening with a number of cases of bubble 
applications although there is no strict legal requirement for this to 
occur. In the case of offset arrangements there is a legal requirement that 
such trades result in reductions in aggregate pollution levels. Two court 
decisions in the US have also argued along these lines.
Strict adherence to technological requirements on pollution controls 
contained in some Australian laws would be a constraint on the range of 
participants in a MPP market. Regulatory agencies would need to adopt a more 
flexible approach if an introduced MPP scheme is to reach its full potential.
On the basis of discussion in previous Chapters and on the emerging 
perceptions and trends in Australia noted above, it is concluded that a MPP 
scheme along the lines of the hybrid pollution offsets form (Section 4.2.3) 
that has been proposed for adoption in Maryland USA (Section 5.6.2) is a 
worthwhile model on which to base the design and implementation of a MPP 
scheme in Australia. A viable market in MPPs would only be possible in 
regions where there is sufficient industrial density and where the 
assimilative capacity of the environment is under pressure. Nevertheless, it 
is concluded that introduction of bubble and offset provisions would be a 
sensible reform to existing standards-based regulations throughout Australia 
because of the potential for increased cost-effectiveness and flexibility in 
the application of environmental regulations.
Notes:
1. This minimum number was selected on the basis of Smith, V.L., (1981),
1 Microeconomic systems as an experimental science1, Economic Discussion 
Paper No. 81-32, University of Arizona. Smith found in market power 
experiments that markets involving one seller and five buyers do not 
achieve monopoly equilibrian but sometimes could achieve competitive 
equilibrium. Quoted in Hahn (1982a)
2. Murphyores Incorporated Pty Ltd v. The Commonwealth (1976) 9 A.L.R. 199.
3. New South Wales v. The Commonwealth (1975) 9 A.L.R. 1.
4. As suggested in, for example, 1 Pollution Intervention: Federal Powers
Grow'. The Australian Environment Management Review Newsletter (1983), 
No.14, p.l.
5. Mr P. Ramsey (1983), Environment Protection Authority of Victoria,
1 personal communication'.
6. Mr J. Bales (1983), Environment Protection Authority of Victoria,
1 personal communication'.
7. Ms J. Wilcox (1983), NSW State Pollution Control Commission, 'personal
communication'.
8. Dr J. Reilly (1983), Queensland Premier's Department, personal 
communication.
9. Mr C. Murray (1983), Western Australia Department of Environment and
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11. Mr J. Bales (1983) Environment Protection Authority of Victoria, 'personal 
communication'.
12. Mr B. Odgers (1982), Commonwealth Department of Home Affairs and 
Environment, 'personal communication'.
13. Mr A. Crapp (1983), NSW State Pollution Control Commission, 'personal 
communication'.
14. Mr D. Hill (1983), Deputy Director, Australian Conservation Foundation, 
'personal communication'.
15. See AEG & NH&MRC, (1983), Enviornment, Health and Economic Implications of 
the Use of Chlorfluorocarbons of Aerosal Propellants and Possible 
Substitutes. Canberra: AGPS.
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CHAPTER 9
CONCLUSIONS AND SUGGESTED AREAS OF RESEARCH
9.1 VALUE OF MARKETABLE POLLUTION PERMIT CONCEPT
The MPP approach is beneficial because it combines the advantages of 
the regulatory command-and-contro1 approach with the advantages of a pollution 
charges approach. By specifying the total quantity of allowed pollution 
discharges, environmental quality is clearly determined as is done under a 
regulatory approach. In addition a price is charged for using the environment 
as a waste receptor as would occur under a pollution charges approach 
(although in this case the price is set by supply and demand in the 
specialised market rather than by the regulatory agency). In particular a MPP 
system can be embedded in existing regulatory pollution control systems 
(rather than replacing them). With appropriate modification to the command- 
and-contro 1 provisions, the embedded MPP provisions complement the direct 
controls by providing more flexibility and cost-effectiveness in achieving 
compliance - should potential participants in the market choose to do so.
It is concluded that MPP schemes, as an economic incentive, are a 
cost-effective approach to managing air and water pollution. The 
establishment of a specialised market for MPPs would enable greater 
efficiencies in pollution control as well as reducing necessary search and 
transaction costs. For the regulatory agency the administrative costs are 
expected to be of the same order of magnitude as under a standards-based 
approach, except during the MPP scheme implementation phase when some extra 
resources may be required. Monitoring and enforcement capabilities will still 
be required. Establishment of baselines and modelling tasks are required 
irrespective of the approach adopted. It is considered that adoption of a 
pollution charges strategy is not as practical as a MPP approach and involves 
additional administrative costs and is a more difficult task for the 
regulatory agency.
From experience overseas it is considered that the most auspicious 
time to introduce MPP regulatory innovations is during episodes of regulatory 
reform, when institutional inertia can best be overcome. Successful attempts 
at reforms have been as incremental adaptations to existing standards-based 
regulations which have been retained.
Existing provisions to allow trading in TDPs or ERCs in the US do 
not compel pollution sources to enter the market for pollution entitlements as 
buyers or sellers. Sources can still choose to just meet the provisions of 
existing s tandards-based regulations. So MPP schemes widen the options 
available to sources to control their pollution.
It is noted that the full market potential of proposed MPP schemes 
is not realised because existing environmental regulations set minimum 
standards or place technological constraints on the levels of pollution 
allowed. In theory MPP schemes could cover all pollution generated and not 
apply just those pollution reductions below the set minimum standards. The 
political/ethical aspects of allowing some pollution sources to increase their 
pollution levels without reference to existing minimum standards is an issue 
that needs resolution. It is suggested, however, that such caution is not 
important provided that the offsetting reductions ensure aggregate pollution 
levels remain the same or are reduced to some extent, and that the pattern of 
pollution discharges after trading in MPPs does not result in violation of set 
ambient environment quality standards. As confidence in a MPP system grows 
these constraints could be reduced if the system is operating successfully.
The MPP concept does not conflict with the 1 Polluter-Pays 
Principle1 . It just ensures that the outcome is more efficiently achieved. 
Regulatory authorities determine the 1 acceptable state' when they decide the 
initial size and distribution of the MPP allocation. The establishment of 
more cost-effective regulations can improve the comparative advantage of firms 
wishing to export and can improve the position of firms in domestic markets. 
In the case of public sector activities, their participation in MPP markets 
can enable their operations to be more efficient, so reducing taxation funding 
requirements. On the other hand, the MPP approach can enable any necessary 
reductions in aggregate pollution levels to be achieved at lower cost than 
under standards-based regulations.
The practical experience with Emission Trading Policy for air 
quality management and the transferable discharge permit requirements for 
water quality management in the USA should still be regarded as experimental 
because the number of transactions has not yet been substantial. To some 
extent this is due to the novelty of these regulatory innovations and 
uncertainty about how markets would operate. In addition existing regulations 
still contain technological constraints on the methods of abating pollution
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and minimum standards requirements which prevent full MPP market potential 
being achieved. Despite these constraints, however, transactions are 
occurring because of the real economic incentives that exist in these MPP 
schemes, otherwise such schemes would not have become established.
9.2 POSSIBLE AUSTRALIAN APPLICATIONS
It is concluded that a MPP scheme along the lines of the hybrid 
pollution offsets form that has been proposed for adoption in Maryland USA is 
a worthwhile model on which to base the design and implementation of a MPP 
scheme in certain situations in Australia. This particular form of MPP scheme 
is one where theoretical developments and practical applications have 
converged. For implementation ease and economic efficiency, the MPP scheme as 
an economic incentive approach is considered superior to the imposition of 
pollution charges for the management of air and water quality. Only in 
regions associated with major cities having sufficient density of pollution 
sources could a specialised and competitive market for MPPs be established and 
become viable.
In situations where a full MPP market is not viable, it is 
nevertheless concluded that provisions akin to the bubble and offsets concepts 
could be introduced throughout Australia with consequent benefits arising from 
reduced aggregate pollution abatement costs. In relation to the bubble 
concept, only one firm with multiple point sources of pollution need be 
involved. With the offsets concept only a minimum of two separate firms need 
be involved (wherther both are existing pollution sources, or when one is a 
new or expanding pollution source while the other is an existing pollution 
source). In both cases there can be opportunities for reduction in pollution 
abatement costs. To some extent this factor is already starting to be 
recognised in Australia. The introduction of such provisions could be 
considered as beneficial adaptions to the existing systems of standards-based 
regulations, rather than radical replacements, with the potential for 
increasing the cost-efficiency of environment regulations and enabling better 
flexibility in their administration.
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9.3 SUGGESTED AREAS OF RESEARCH
MPPs schemes are not an academic curiosity to be studied at leisure, 
but a practical environment protection policy innovation meriting serious 
consideration. Consequently this paper finds that a number of institutional 
and technical issues involved in designing and implementing MPP schemes should 
now be seriously researched by industry, regulatory and other government 
agencies, academia and community groups in Australia.
An important applied research area is the study of actual TDP or ERC 
transactions that are taking place in the USA. Potential MPP market 
structures also require investigation.
Initially, research in Australia could usefully concentrate on:
(i) the 1 density1 of sources of each type of pollution (i.e. their 
location and amounts of pollution generated;
(ii) the abatement costs of each pollution source;
(iii) pollution dispersion/dilution models for Australian conditions;
(iv) determination of ambient environment quality standards.
These studies would be necessary precursors for simulations of 
possible MPP trading activity. Then the value of introducing MPP regulations 
as well as their design could start to be researched.
Besides researching static and dynamic potential cost savings as a result of 
improved efficiency, another area of MPP implementation that requires research 
is into the transfer payments that may be incurred by consumers and non-MPP 
holders. The extent of these transfer payments will depend on the form of the 
MPP system implemented and the extent to which the existing regulatory scheme 
is changed.
Decision-makers will base their judgement of the acceptability of 
MPP scheme designs on achieving a number of objectives. The following are the 
main areas of policy research required:
(i) environment quality maintenance
(ii) cost-efficiency
(iii) equity
(iv) certainty of outcome
(v) ease of implementation.
Undertaking case studies is essential, and current research about the 
Newcastle airshed provides an early opportunity to investigate the potential 
for MPP schemes, or components thereof, in one region of Australia.
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GLOSSARY
This glossary is largely based on Joeres & David (eds)(1983).
Ambient-based Permit System (APS)
A system whereby permits written in terms of a proportion or quantity of the 
environment s assimilative capacity, not in terms of the absolute level of 
discharge, are traded. Trades under this system preserve or improve existing 
ambient environmental quality at all critical points or receptors. (Applies 
to both air and water markets.)
Banking
A USEPA provision that allows firms to accumulate credit for past emission 
reductions. A firm that permanently reduces its emission loading rate by a 
given amount may sell that amount or loading rate to another firm at any time 
after the original reduction. Through this belated 1 trade1, the total loading 
rate of emissions is maintained or reduced. (Sales or trades are permitted so 
long as they do not result in new violations of ambient environmental quality 
standards or prevent the planned removal of an ambient environmental quality 
violation.)
Biochemical Oxygen Demand (BOD)
A measure of the demand for oxygen generated by organic waste discharged into 
a water system. BOD^ is BOD that takes five days to decompose.
Bubble
A USEPA provision that allows 'swaps' of emissions of a particular pollutant 
within plants, across plants and even across firms, provided pollution is not 
made worse. (Usually applies to air market.)
Emission-based Permit System (EPS)
A system whereby permits written in terms of absolute levels of discharge or 
emission are traded. Trades under this system preserve the total discharge or 
emission loading within the market. (Applies to air and water markets.)
Grandfathering
Distribution of permits or other rights based on their historical share of 
that market or waste proportion.
Marketable Pollution Permit (MPP)
Generic term used here to cover the various types of pollution control 
regulatory schemes which allow legal trading in pollution permits in specially 
created markets as their key feature. Such schemes as transferable discharge 
permits (TDPs), ambient-based pollution permit systems (APS), emission-based 
pollution permit systems (EPS) and pollution-offsets systems (POS) are 
included in this general term. (Applies to air and water markets.)
Offsets
A USEPA provision that allows a firm to increase its emission loading rate if 
another firm offsets this increase by a simultaneous, equivalent reduction in 
its loading rate. (For comments on restrictions and total loadings, see 
Banking.)
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Pareto optimality
An allocation of resources is Pareto optimal, or Pareto efficient, when every 
other allocation that makes one agent better off necessarily makes at least 
one other agent worse off.
Pollution Offsets System (POS)
A system whereby permits written in terms of a proportion or quantity of the 
environment's assimilative capacity are traded. Trades may reduce 
environmental quality at some receptors so long as the ambient quality 
standard is not exceeded at any critical receptor or point. (Applies to air 
and water markets.)
Priority Pollution Rights System (PPRS)
A system whereby prioritized permits are traded. Junior rights yield to 
senior rights in a predetermined order during periods of reduced assimilative 
capacity.
Receptor Point
These points are not necessarily the locations at which monitoring equipment 
is situated. For example, a pollution concentration gradient can be 
constructed for an area which is based on monitoring data in conjunction with 
an air diffusion model. The environment agency would select points on that 
gradient (e.g. the locations of pollution 1 black spots') to be receptor 
points.
Trading coefficient
The rate at which emissions/discharges from one firm can substitute for those 
from another firm with no change in ambient conditions at the mutually 
affected critical point or receptor. (Applies to APS in both air and water 
markets.)
Transfer coefficient
Measure of the environmental quality impact of a particular source on a 
specific receptor. (Applies to air and water markets.)
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